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FPJSFAGB
This study was originally to have examined only the 
actual negotiations for the proposed Anglo-German loan, to Por­
tugal in I898# In order to delve into this historical prob­
lem, however, it became necessary to set the stage for the 
actual narrative. In this case the stag® has become almost 
a panoramic view of th© diplomacy of the late nineteenth cen­
tury. It is difficult to separate any European diplomatic
issue of this period from the Iron Chancellor of Germany,
Otto von Bismarck, and since this m s  also a period of bur­
geoning colonies, the author has briefly examined both Bis­
marck! an diplomacy and colonial expansion in Africa. The 
author hopes his first two chapters have not become overly 
extended in his attempt to portray th© diplomatic and colonial 
problems which formed the basis of misunderstanding and dis­
trust in the final negotiations.
In order to avoid possible confusion the author would 
like to point out several stylistic adaptations. Following 
accepted procedure th© author has insert©! an nen into um- 
lauted German words. He has also abbreviated th© headings on 
diplomatic exchanges to just th® surname of th© correspondent. 
Further Identification is provided either within the text or
in the Preference Index in Appendix B.
11
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fh# author wishes to express his sincere appreciation 
to th© members of th© faculty of th© Department of History, 
Uni verslly of Omaha* for the words of criticism and advice
given him while he served as Intern in th# Department* Spe­
cial thanks are due to Drs* Raymond A. Smith, Jr. and Georg# 
A# Bothrock, Jr., under whom he served in the above position. 
He is particularly indebted to Mr* David Adams for his as­
sistance with the maps to his advisor, Dr* A. Stanley 
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CHAPTER I
THE 3ISMAHCKIAK ERA f 1870-1890
The last four decades of the nineteenth century brought 
an abrupt shift of European interest from the continent to 
other areas of the world* Adventurers explored unknown areas 
of Africa and the South Seas. Continental rivals often 
worked side by side in colonial areas* The three largest 
powers, Germanyf France, and Great Britain claimed territory 
and concessions in southeast Asia and Africa* The exploration 
and division of the latter provides an excellent example of 
continental rivalry in colonial areas in the late nineteenth 
century*
Africa had been a lfdark continent*1 prior to th© expedi­
tions of discovery of th© mid-nineteenth century* While there 
were European settlements in Africa before this time, most 
were along the coasts. Rarely did the claimant attempt to 
establish territorial limitations; even more infrequently were 
settlements incorporated into integral colonies*
Portugal was the first European power in modern times 
to settle African territory south of the Sahara. As early as 
l¥fl she had established a slave trade in posts north of the 
equator, and by the beginning of the seventeenth century Por­
tuguese settlements existed on both the east and west coasts
2of southern Africa* Angola, the western settlement, soon 
emerged as the more important, due to the thriving slave trade 
with the Hew World*^
the leading European colonial power was Great Britain, 
a country which had established colonies or interests in North 
America, Asia, Australia, and Africa. Ih the latter region, as 
in the others, Great Britain originally had entered upon a 
colonial policy for economic advantage. Many felt that It 
would be possible to realise a favorable balance of trade*
In 1652 the Dutch established the first European settlement 
on the south African cape; the British soon followed suit* A 
strong rivalry developed between the two powers over the ex­
cellent harbor facilities at the Gape* In 1781 a British 
squadron made an unsuccessful attempt to seise the Dutch set­
tlement; a later effort proved more rewarding, however, and 
the British established control in 1795* After briefly re­
verting to the Dutch after the Peace of Amiens in 1802, the 
territory became permanently British in 1806*'~' From this 
date, British interests In Africa continued tc expand, although 
at times at a very slow rata*
Dissatisfaction with British rule and particularly with
^ James Duffy, Portuguese Afy,lea, (Cambridge 1 Harvard 
University Press, 19W), P* W *  Hereafter cited as Duffy, 
.Portuguese} Africa. The ' slave trade comprised about eighty 
per cent of the total exports of Angola* Ibid*
P James A* Williamson, £ Bfoort Hi,story o.fr British Ex­
pansion* 2M  M o m  Smnir^ M  ComgiomSlth. vol. 11 (hth 
ed*; Londons Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1958), pp. 116-120. 
Hereafter cited as Williamson, British Expansion.
the slavery abolition settlement of 1833 and I83V caused 
many of the Dutch, or Boers, to move to what later became 
the Transvaal, Natal, and the Orange Free State in the Af­
rican. interior. Gradually, however, Britain extended her 
control to areas north of the Cape Colony and there again 
arose difficulties between the two peoples* Finally, in 
18-13, Hatal was declared a British colony, and the Trans­
vaal and the Orange Free State were annexed. The latter 
two regions were allowed independence as long as they out­
lawed slavery.^
The French, too, had established claims in Africa prior 
to the expansionistic explosion of the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, although these claims were north of the 
Sahara* Charles X, in an attempt to divert public attention 
from domestic problems to foreign glory, sent an expedition 
to Algeria in I83O. The expedition was successful, although 
the success did not reach the home scene; the monarch was 
forced to abdicate in July, th© same month Algiers fell.
The new government of Louis Philippe faced the difficult 
problem of either administaring or disposing of the newly 
acquired territory. The few Frenchmen who desired expansion 
were, for the most part, naval officials who saw the strat­
egic value of a base on the southern shore of the Mediter­
ranean. Several years' passed before the government decided 
to expand from the initial base at Algiers; it was not
3 Williamson, British teaoslon. II, 121-128.
until tlio fall of Constantine in, l8'37* that Trance embarked 
on a definite colonial policy in florth Africa#
A map published in 1866 showed large blank spaces over
It
men of the unexplored African interior# Less than two 
decades earlier, the British missionary and explorer,
David Livingstone, entered southern Africa., on the first of 
his important journeys; Richard Irrncis Burton and John Han­
ning Speke entered the depths of central Africa in the late
ie?o*s#
Livingstone, Burton, Speke, Samuel Raker, who explored
the Upper Rile, and others published fascinating, if not
always accurate, accounts of thoir encounters with 51 darkest 
*>Africa#These treatises not only whetted lie Interest of 
the 3uropear>f, but they also dispelled a number of fears and 
mis e one o pt ions about the continent*^
J. Simmons, “The Opening of Tropical Africa, 1870-1835,
V .  9 ■? _  'f'tJt ?- . . J . n  «r>. . J» 1- * *  m ~TT •**<■ •** *«— *****
itloiv
varsity Press, 1959)5 P* 65# Hereafter cited as Cambridge.
SsiMsh Im i m *
The deluge of publications began with Livingstone1 s
Simmlzi in Santii AO&aa (1857).
Soon after this fallowed Burton’s L^kc Roglmg.^  of Central 
Africa (1860)^Jpeke’s ^ o f ,
>3), Grant CIS6 ; ’s A Walk Asr.aga __
on*s S 14. Hllq A"xia (105+), Aivta-rstsne
aa&ga a£. a&i&aMlSAaa 1a la a  U a lian .,m a  i£&  'SvXhntsr.:
(18o5)> and Balter’s inhere «*yaasa (1866).
Geographers and cartographers sot forth many theories 
concerning the source of the Hile^ and it yms with, this 
oroblem that many explorers of this period concerned them­
selves# for an Interesting recent account of the expiora11 on 
of the Upper Hilo, see Alan Uoorahead % Ullc (How
York* Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), 23!UdB*
5Geographical societies, missionary societies, and 
other private organisations financed most of the expecii- 
tions to the African Interior* As Europeans gained more in­
formation about the geography and. the potential wealth of 
the land, speculators formed organizations to promote the 
exploration and to spread European religion, culture, and 
civilisation to the f,newt1 continent.
The expeditions also became symbolic of a new national 
pride. Sir Charles Dilke soon became a leading spokesman 
of the rising imperial sentiment in Great Britain, a sen­
timent which also was apparent in other countries. Dilke, 
in his Greater Britain (1868), pointed out to his fellow ~
Englishmen that wSaxondom will rise triumphant from the
*7doubtful struggle** with the ♦‘cheaper” races.r Imperialism 
became a factor in governmental policy as well as private 
enterprise, and it was around this problem that a great cart 
of European diplomacy revolved in the last few decades of 
the nineteenth century.
Great Britain long had followed a twofold policy to­
ward Europe-— non-involvement so long as th© balance of power 
was not endangered and, after l8l5, the maintenance of the 
neutrality of the low countries. Th© French Revolution 
forced Britain to actively Intervene in order to protect 
her interests, but Castlereagh restored non-involvement as soon as 
it was expedient. It was not until the Crimean War that
7 Charles Wentworth Dilke, Greater Britain: 4 Record 
of Travel in Engl 1 sh-Speakin#_ffiun.tries (oth ed.; Londons 
Macmillan and Co., 1890J, P*
6Britain again entered into a coalition with European coun­
tries* This time her purpose was to maintain her Influence 
in the Stralts~a thorny problem for many years— and to pre­
vent Russia from gaining entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.
In the same year that Mike published greater Britain, 
the liberal* William S. Gladstone, formed his first ministry! 
the new Prime Minister vowed to continue a policy of non­
expansion in the face of the rising interest in Africa* Glad­
stone realized that he would face possible conflicts with 
other countries if he entered Africa, and the pending “AlabamaH 
claims dispute further convinced him of the wisdom of non- 
involvoment. Hi 1869, in a lengthy letter to the queen*s 
private secretary, the Prime Hintstor condemned the cost of 
British participation in the- continental wars. Although he 
did not absolutely oppose intervention, Gladstone did not 
want Britain to become entangled in continental alliances.
She should not
encourage the weak by giving expectations of aid 
to resist the strong, but should rather seek. to„ 
deter the strong by firm but moderate language.**
While Gladstone in this instance was summarising what he
thought to be the policy of his foreign minister, Lord
Clarendon, they were words to which he wholeheartedly
ascribed.
 ^ “Gladstone to Grey," in John Morley, Thq Life. o,f 
William Swart Gladstone, vol. II (New York* The Macmillan 
Company, 1903)t PP* 317-318. Hereafter cited as Morley,
7After the death of Clarendon In June, 1870, Lord Gran­
ville received the seals of the Foreign Office; he managed 
England1s foreign affairs during the brief Franco-Prussiea 
War* When the Hohenzollern candidacy threatened the peace 
of Europe, Gladstone surprisingly declared, his sympathy for 
the French position* As French demands became more strong, 
and both the French and the Prussian, governments moved toward 
the Impending conflict, It became apparent that there was lit­
tle Great Britain could do to forestall hostilities.^
Although Britain had declared her neutrality, she re­
fused to imoose restrletions on munitions to th© belligerents. 
Since France had the vessels to secure the weapons, and Ger­
many did not, the British position brought sharp protest 
from the Prussian chief minister, Otto von Bismarck, The war 
quickly ended, but the British action, coupled with Bismarck’s 
inherent distrust of the Liberal “Professor*,'4' brought an es­
trangement between the old island kingdom and the growing
continental newer. At the end of the war th© British Cabinet
refused to protest the Prussian seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, 
as Gladstone had suggested; but this action failed to restore 
Prussian confidence in Great Britain, although it did allevl-
Great Britain had 20,000 men available for service in 
the event of war. Paul Knaplund, Gladstone1s Foreign Policy 
{Hew Xork* Harper and Brothers Publishers, 193?X, ppV W - W T
^  Raymond James Son tag, G ermanv Gnr lands B&ckgr otxnft
of Conflict, l8M3~l89lf (Hew forks D. AoDleton-0e.ii.turv Comoanv, 
k i S $ :  TteFeafter cited as Sentag, Sorsanv a M  
En-land. Bismarck derisively referred to Gladstone as the 
“Professortf*
8ate the situation to a certain extent
The Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 ended the short war be- 
tween France and Prussia and brought a dramatic shift of 
political strength from, western to central Europe. The 
sweeping continental changes were largely the result of 
Bismarck, who became the Imperial Chancellor of the new Gor­
man Empire* From th© bog Inning of the Second Reich on <Jar:n— 
ary 18* 1871, until he was dismissed by William II in 1890, 
Bismarck ruled Germany with a strong hand. Although the 
Kaiser had appointed his chancellor and conceivably could re­
move him when he wanted, B1 snrrckts strong will, fast-flowing 
tears, and frequent threats .1 resignation, ©roved more than 
a match for the aged William I.
The period from 1871 to 1890, however, was more than an 
era of Bismarck in Germany? It was an era of Bismarck In 
Europe. The man who had formed a new Empire through a policy 
of ^blood and iron*1 Inspired fear and respect in other rulers. 
He established an intricate alliance system to isolate France?
this, felt Bismarck, would effectively maintain the peace in 
.12Europe.' The Hr elkalser band was an agreement among the em­
perors of Austria, Russia, and Germany? by this understanding 
Bismarck hoped to maintain the status quo and preserve the
11 Korley, Sladstoae. II, &7-3M and E. W. Seton-Watson, 
;ain ia BuropeT l7B^19I^« 4 Survey o£ Foreign Policy (Cam- 
bridge* At the University Press,19©5), p* **99* Hereafter 
cited as Seton-Watson, Briialp In Europe.
^  Bee particularly William L. Banger, Earpaean Alliance
Alignments. 1871-1890 (Hew Yorks Alfred A. Knopi- 19507, 
passim. Hereafter cited as banger, Alliances a,pd Alignments
9peace. Bismarck later attempted to forestall any possible 
Austro-Hussian hostilities by concluding unilateral agree- 
mont s w  th ooili govori iments. The Triole Alliance, signed a 
decade later (1382), further demonstrated Bismarck1 s- astute 
diplomatic maneuvers and his ability to bring apparent unity 
among former enemies. The Reich had reached agreements or 
understandings with all the major -ewers of Europe with the 
exception of France and Great Britain* 'France could be ren­
dered poverless through a close-knit alliance system, but the 
knot could bo draim even tighter if the Chancellor could secure 
the support of Franco’s last possible ally— Great Britain.
He realised, however, that it would be quite difficult to 
secure an agreement with any British government and that it 
would be almost impossible to gain the support of the Liberal 
Prime Minister, William Gladstone.
The British liberal leader faced an uphill battle in his bid 
for re-election in 1-3 7**-• The conservative opposition lea by 
Benjamin Disraeli took advantage of the rising Imperial sen­
timent created by Sir Charles Dilke and others and accused the 
Prime Minister of having sacrificed British prestige abroad.
In a speech at Manchester In April, 1872, and amplified in his 
famous Crystal Palace speech later that 2/ear, Disraeli not 
only pleaded for better working conditions within the country, 
but he also challenged, the stand of th© Liberal Party on colonial 
and Imperial issues^wo years later Disraeli became Prime 
Minister; his stand on colonial issues had won him a number 
of supporters and probably had assured his election.
10
In addition to the domestie attacks, Gladstone also faced 
the vilification of the German Chancellor* R* J* Sontag comes
to the surprising conclusion that Bismarck*s condemnation of 
the flProfessor** awakened Great Britain to th© ^realization that 
their interests would boat be served by conciliating a rising 
state which had the power to help or hurt England* Bis** 
merck perhaps also attacked the British .Liberal policies in 
an attempt to reduce the strength of the German liberals, lad 
by the Crown Prince* lie matter what the reason, tie Chancel­
lor desired the election of the Conservative candidate, and 
when Disraeli became Prime Minister, prospects for closer 
Anglo^German ties' appeared bright*
Disraeli embarked upon a policy of renewed activity In 
colonial affairs when he assumed power in l87*n A year after
he entered office Disraeli purchased the Khedive of Egypt13 
1 h*shares™ in the Suez Canal Company— an action which Gladstone 
had earlier rejected* Although Disraeli*s purchase of canal 
stock did not bring political control of the canal, it did 
cause Britain*s voice to be heard In the management of the 
new route* The new royal title, rress of India, given, to 
Queen Tictorla. in 18?6 after a vigorous and embarrassing
sontag, garmapy and 'England* p* 89*
•j
i+ 176,602 out of a total of ^00,000 shares. The British
investment later brought favorable public reaction for inter­
vention. to protect British interests in the Canal* A# 1* P. 
Taylor, The Struggle, fay, Mastery In £jurone» 1.8k8-1.91-9 in fh9 
■Oxford History of Modern Bur ope % Alan'Bullock, @d* (Oxford I 
At the Clarendon Press, 19ytT” P* 23?ru Hereafter cited as 
Taylor, Struggle for
11
struggle with the liberals, symbolised the renewed interest 
in colonial activity.
It was more than political prestige, however,. whrich 
motiveted Disraelifs desire for expansion. Foreign trade, 
long important to tho British economy, became increasingly 
vital with the rapid rise of izidustrialiaation in tho nine­
teenth century. As ether notions became industrialised, the 
"British share of the world market declined.' Disraeli and 
other British leaders sought to accelerate the economy and 
found the renewed Internet in colonies as a possible solution. 
The opening of the Suer Canal had brought an increase in 
trade with the Far Fast, and Disraeli took steps to keep the 
new route open. Investors were encouraged by the bold, ven­
ture of Disraeli, and financial intercuts began to seel: out 
markets and materials' in the other newly opened territories.
At the same time the British Government began its policy 
of expansion. Imperial Germany, led by Bismarck, retreated 
from the prospect of acquiring territory outside continental 
Burope. Many Gormans had earlier urged active colonisation. 
Frederick List held that colonies would provide an outlet for 
surplus populati on,and Wilhelm Hoscher emphasised that 11 Germany
15 William Ashworth, M  l£2S2li£ Si England*
U za-1232 in  m . gaaaga&s Iftgfcaz a£ 3agfep» - * s . Ashton,
ad. (London.: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 19b0), pp. 133-139*
•” Despite the new governmental attitude British exports 
to Africa, Burope, and South America remained static or de­
clined In the period 1879 to 1889 relative to other countries* 
Exports to other areas failed to compensate for the relative 
decline of Great Brita in* » P* 3.J+,3»
la
must lose no time if the last suitable territories are not
Germans formed associations for the ourposo of promoting 
colonisation, but they seldom called for the establishment 
.of political sovereignty over the now areas, Settlors re­
turned to Gorman lands and spoke of the valuable territory in
Africa| explorers called for the establishment of control
1Pover tho lands they had cha??ted.
Despite the sympathy for colonial activity in a number
of the German states Before 1871, Bismarck opposed a policy
of expansion* The Chancellor felt that Germany* s energies
should be concentrated on the continent; imperial activity
could be a potential source of hostilities;
the attempt to establish colonies in territories 
'Whose suzerainty is claimed by other States, 
whether rightly or vr'v ly, might lead to mani­
fold and undesirable disputes**9
Colonies would be detrimental, maintained Bismarck, because 
•’they could only be defended by powerful fleets, and Ger­
many1 s geographical position did. not necessitate her develop- 
merit into a first-class maritime Power*11 Military leaders
c seised by other and more resolute n
17■“*"* f , .TM Qmrnm
Ail tv Movemapt* vol* II (Hew fork; The '"mcmilSn Com*
f  5, p , 17? • Hereafter cited as Dawson* Gorman Smvi:





opposed extra- ter r I tor ial expansion because it would deplete 
trie size of tho forces available witMn the country. .Ad­
miral Albrecht von Stosch, the founder of the Imperial llavy, 
countered the latter argument by privately suggesting that 
since so many Germans were leaving'the country to escape th© 
rigorous military service, It would be wise to establish a 
place for Germans to settle rather than have them go to th# 
United States
The German Chancellor also suggested that colonial activ­
ity was a place whore Goeat Britain and Prance could concen­
trate their resources, A Trench colonial policy could divert 
the Third Bspnblic from action on behalf of Alsace-Lorraine, 
particularly if Germany should support French claims* Ger­
man eonsetit!on with Great Britain could not bring advantages 
to the former, but it could bring a. return of Britain to con­
tinental affairs and perhaps , worst of all, an Anglo-French 
alliance against the Belch, If both Great Britain aad Franc# 
would enter Africa, there would arise territorial disrates,
po
and Britain, seeking colonial support, would turn to Germany.~ 
Bismarck* s words about colonial rivalries soon proved pro­
phetic, as BtiP-opean nations began to vie with each other over 
control of African territory*
2 1 Frederic B. M. Hollyday, BisTOrcfc'a Rival, 4 Political 
Blpgraiohy 24 General k%s&K£l 434£2fiM. Z2fl fifeasfifc (Durham*
Sake Gnlverslty Brass, 19o0j, pp. 120, 123.
22 C. Grant Robertson, Bismarck in jfafcsRa 24 &J2. lU&Sr 
teeath Century. Basil Williams, ed. (London: Constable and 
Company, Ltd*, 1913), pp. %l7-kl9.
Ih
? f -? •*-, «  - v - P  
X 'JL - i  V 1  i  ^  ^ —1^ —♦
" O ' i T  » ■ » 4 1 ■*w i  r *  ^
’’W —tv .y} ^ lied a meeting
o  opening of.» A  s *n fs ' f *  >"S a *l» -.u, aCa* '•■J European
g formed an ’ iR -V  i  't. *j ■*•'% v'-. 4-‘ A  J L l i  U U  ri -JX A u l  African
hi Brussels to discuss 
countries* This gather 
Association for th© purpose of co-ordinating tho colonial ©IV 
forts of the member groups; it also established branches in 
the home countries of each of the participating members* Th© 
central or gaxix as. t ~ on , howov ©r , soon. i.dl under wn© sway* of 
the Belgian icing, and the venture failed. With the demise of 
the Association the brief hope of co-operative ventures on a 
large scale disa^ 5 o © ai/©ct a.i ici Burocean powers began to carve 
out colonial empires for themselves in Africa.
Leopold created the Congo Free Boat© under his personal 
supervision a year after the .nations had mat in Brussels.
The next year, in 1880, Savorgnan de Brazza* a french adven­
turer, lay claim to the region north of the Congo lUver for 
his country. Italy quickly showed her willingness to add 
African territory to her peninsular holdings, and Portugal as­
serted her claim to much of the western coast south of th®
Congo River.
The Gorman Chancellor, although he had tried to stem 
the tide of colonial sentiment, was not able to stop German
private enterprise from extra-territorial ventures. Mission­
ary activity had begun almost thirty years prior to th© 
founding of the Bmpire, and German influence expanded from a 
tiny nucleus on the west coast of southern Africa as other 
settlers moved into th© area from the Fatherland. Great Britain 
had already claimed the best port facilities on tho south*
15
western coast at Waifisell (Whale) Bay. It appeared that a 
conflict of interest could develop, although the German en­
terprise was strictly a private venture.
During a tribal war in 1880, the Imperial German Govern­
ment asked Britain to extend protection to the German citizens 
outside Walflsch Bay} Great Britain agreed to protect the 
German nationals* but only if they were within British ter­
ritory. In an effort to secure protection for his holdings, 
Brans A* Luederitz? a wealthy Bremail merchant, asked the Ger­
man Government for assistance. Bismarck, although It meant 
an opening of colonial responsibilities, surprisingly agreed 
to this proposal, but only if the settlements were In previ­
ously unclaimed territory.^3 This step marked the beginning 
of a German imperial policy, although at first it was under 
the firm control of the Iron Chancellor*
Bismarck discreetly asked the British Foreign Office 
whether England had claims in th© area under consideration} 
ten months later the British Government replied to Bismarck1s 
query. Although Her Majesty1s Government claimed only two 
places on the west coast,^ It felt that
!,any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a 
foreign Power between the southern point of Por­
tuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18 and the 
frontier of Gape Colony would Infringe their 
legitimate rights.
2’ Dawson, Saipan Snrdre. II, 188. See also Banger, 
Alllanc.es a M  Alignments, p. 292.
Walflsch Bay and the islands outside the harbor at 
Angra Pecuena.
25 Oawson, Sar-flan 2aalm» II» 189.
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Britain thus maintained that wi'fle she did not claim the area, 
no one else could either* Bismarck quickly reacted to this 
unilateral British proclamation of a "Honrce Doctrine11 and 
formally established a protectorate over the west coast of 
Africa, from tho boundary of Gape Colony on the Orange Hover 
to the Portuguese territory of Angola*^
The semi-official Koeliiische geitung launched violent 
attacks against Gladstone and the British policy. These as­
saults were paralleled by continued German expansion, as tho 
Imperial Government added part of Hew Guinea, a few Pacific 
islands, Togo, Kamerun, and some territory on the east coast 
of Africa*
The Chancellor for years had strongly opposed a colonial 
policy for Germany, arid one may wonder why he abandoned his 
earlier principles and actively sought additional territo­
ries* lust as Bismarck earlier thought only of Germany when 
he refrained from colonisation, he now thought only of im­
proving the Belch when he entered the colonial field. The 
Chancellor discerned opportunities which an expansionist 
policy offered to his European system of alliances and also 
the possibility of gaining greater domestic support for his 
programs* .Pressure groups were active5 romantics desired 
expansion; and merchants sought imperial protection, but th©
^  In May, 188**, a month, after Germany had established 
claim to the western coast, the Cape Colony Government an­
nounced a plan to extend control over the coastal territory 
from the Orange River to Walflsch Bay, completely ignoring 
the earlier German claims* This move did not improve Anglo- 
German relations.
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influence* of these groups on Bismarck is questionable. In 
1870 Herbert Bismarck attempted to explain his father1s sud­
den entrance into the colonial field by referring to the 
English* or liberal, threat!
*f!ihen we started [our] colonial policy, we had 
to face a long reign by th© Grom Prince* during 
•which English influence would predominate. In 
order to forestall thiS| we had to launch M  
colonial policy, which is popular and can pro­
duce conflicts'with England at any moment.**£7
In addition to this, a popular colonial policy sight secure
a co-operative Keichstag in the fall elections. Bismarck
never adopted a colonial policy out of conviction, but merely
used its popularity for his own purposes! #I am against it
[colonial expansion]*1 he maintained, fhnt I allow it to
drive
The European political scene was of far greater influ­
ence on Bismarck when he commenced his colonial policy than 
were domestic considerations. Th® amicable Anglo-French 
relations of the era of the Franco-Prusaian War had shorn 
signs of deteriorating because of Disraeli*s purchase of the 
Suez Canal stock and the British occupation of Egypt* Although 
Gladstone said his move into Egypt was only temporary, the 
British occupation continued. England1© recognition of Por­
tugal1 s claim to the mouth of the Congo in February, 188k, 
further strained Anglo-French relations, for France had
p. 293.
rmxm Frelherrn von Eckardstein, Leb.ens-Brlnperup£.; 
!&& Pol It Is oho Dertoagr atghef tea van Batse.haffl.srat &. 2- » vol.
I (teipzlg: Verlac Paul List., 1919), pp. 307. Hereafter
cited as Eckardsteln, Erir
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claimed this region several years earlier.
The IT?each revanche feeling had shown signs of weakening* 
and Franca-German relations had improved since the war scare 
of 1875* It is possible that Bismarck was seeking to achieve 
closer ties between the two countries; Bismarck could mend 
Berlin-Paris differences by adopting an anti-British policy 
In colonial fields. Although tensions between Franc© and Ger­
many were too strong to allow an alliance, there perhaps could 
oq
be an entente.*™' The British reluctance to recognise German 
claims in Africa prompted the Chancellor to side with France 
at a conference on Egyptian finance, and Great Britain could 
see her growing Isolation from continental powers.
While the desire for a Franco-German rapprochement per­
haps is plausible* it is necessary to remember that Bismarck 
did not wish to alienate England. It is possible that through 
colonial pressure and an apparent pro-French attitude Bis­
marck was attempting to foster closer relations with the is­
land kingdom; German diplomats often employed such pressure—  
usually without success. The Chancellor realised, that without 
the friendship of the British Koyal Navy* he was wasting his 
energies on a colonial policy; thus an anti-British endeavor 
seams unlikely. Because of Bismarck1s new colonial activities
29 Taylor, atraagl. f& H  Mastery* p p .  286-302. Taylor
maintains that Bismarck was "playing genuinely for agreement 
with Franc©." Ibid.. p. 296. The premier and foreign minis­
ter of France* Jules Ferry, had fostered a renewed French, 
colonial policy as he entered Tunis, Bado-China* and equa­
torial Africa. By working with France against Britain In th© 
colonial field* Bismarck could establish a Franco-German 
friendship.
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Britain could see the value of Garnan friendship; Germany*s 
support of Russia in the Hear 'East or of France in Bgypt 
could endanger the British policies abroad*^
Lord Granville, .Gladstone1 s foreign Secretary, soon 
ended France1s brief period of friendship with Germany when 
he disclosed a secret Gorman offer for Britain to take Egypt* 
Onea again a ravagehe policy asserted itself in Franc© against 
the "treacherous German11, and Bismarck openly turned to the 
"Profossor*n By March, 188?, Gladstone and Bismarck had put 
aside their antagonisms, at least oublically, and tentatively 
welcomed each other as partners "in the execution of the great 
purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind.tf^
The combination of crises over the commencement of Ger­
man colonisation, Russian advances Into Afghanistan, the ali­
enation of Prance, and particularly the death of General 
!fCh:Ln.ese,, Gordon at Khartoum, brought an end to the Glad­
stone ministry, and Lord Salisbury assumed power in June,
1885. The new prime minister felt the situation could be 
rectified only by closer co-operation with Germany. Bis­
marck also sought closer ties with Great Britain, for the 
reappearance of the Eastern Question threatened to end the 
Dr a ikais orbund* renewed only two years earlier. Perhaps 
the Chancellor also feared possible isolation*
Having demonstrated the value of German, friendship,
3° Son tag, Ge^ppy and England* pp. 19]+~196.
^  Ibid,., p. 201* The words are Gladstone^.
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Bismarck abandoned bis colonial policy* He felt he had all 
the colonies he wanted and 1 already nor a • * . than Germany 
could digest#f3^ The Chancellor openly sought closer ties 
Kith the new British Prime Minister and maintained that 11 the 
friendship of Salisbury is worth more to me feismarckj than 
twenty swampy African eoloniesJ^S
Although Bismarck himself again had turned toward Bug- 
land,, the German press still uttered words of warning* The 
lioolnlsche Beltuns. on June 22, 188?, stated that Britain had 
to recognise that Germany still had colonial aspirations:
•If Bag land is now prepared to accept Germany as a competitor, 
friendship is possible and desirable, but it must be on the 
now hasis**^
As colonial expansion continued, the African territorial 
rivalries became more bitter. Despite Anglo-German friend­
ship on the official level, a strong territorial rivalry 
developed in southeastern Africa. Germany had entered this 
region in October, 188**, when Dr* Gerhard Hohlfs was appointed 
consul in Zanzibar. The Imperial Government immediately gave 
assurances to Great Britain that it would not annex additional 
African territory. At the sane time Karl Peters, who had bean
32 From a summary of a memorandum by Sir Philip Currie 
concerning his conversations with .el smo rck, September 2-8 to
&£
:or cited as Cecil, Salisbury* 
33 Bekartstein, Brinnerunran* !, 307*
-*■ f *
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concerted to the colonial gospel while visiting Sngland, es­
tablished a colonial propaganda organization, The Society for 
German Colonisation. Peters assembled an expedition and vent 
to Africa. Again the German Government denied any plan to 
secure additional territory. iJhile in the interior in late 
Peters, acting on his own initiative, signed treaties 
with native chieftains and presented his Government with over 
60,000 square miles of territory.3?
Further difficulties arose when the British Bast Africa 
Association entered the area In 1836 and attempted to secure 
territory between the African lakes and the east coast. Since 
Peters* claims wore somewhat vague, the two companies soon 
were involved in border disputes. Although a XrO&don-Berliu 
conference (November, 1836) settled this problem in a peaceful 
maimer, new expeditions by Peters again threatened the peace 
in Africa*^
Bismarck continued to press for an Anglo-Germany alli­
ance, but in every instance he was rebuffed by Salisbury. 
During the close Franco-Eussian co-operation in the Egyptian 
question in 1887, however, Great Britain moved closer to 
the Triple Alliance, and rumors that England and Germany had 
signed an alliance circulated through the continental Foreign 
Offices. Salisbury denied them all*38
35 Dawson, .German SiSifli# XI> 215-316.
36 p. h» Hlnsley, "International Rivalry, 1885-1895," 
Cambridge British M a i m ,  HI, 266-267.
37 Ibid.. Ill, 25^—260.
3® Harold Temperley and T.illian M. Penson, Foundations
In the fall of 1889 Bismarck asked Great Britain for a 
further settlement of African colonial problems• Salisbury 
readily agreed to this proposal, since Earl Peters had left 
on another expedition into Africa. Many felt the Peters* 
expedition into the Uganda region would threaten the British 
position in the Sudan and in Egypt.3^ The too powers, however, 
were unable to reach an immediate agreement, as governmental 
changes in Germany brought the proceedings to a standstill.
The death of William I in 1888 strikingly affected the 
diplomacy of the late nineteenth century. Bismarck had 
exercised great control over tho aged Kaiser, but there had 
long been poor relations between the Chancellor and the new 
Kaiser, Frederick III. William1s son, however, wan incurably 
striken with throat cancer when ho came to the throne, and 
consequently, the liberal forces, so long feared, were de­
prived of their hope for political ascendency after only
_______ _ 62#
Hereafter cited as Temper ley. British gorflijm Bailey. For 
a full discussion of England’s relationship with the Irtwie 
Alliance see Joseph V. Fuller, BismarcK* s M S&W SZ S& .Sts 
Zenith (Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1922).
There persisted throughout the nineteenth century 
the theory that the country which controlled the Kile’s 
sources could control Egypt merely by damming off the river*
Of greater significance, of course, was the fact that, while 
the British navy and military effectively controlled tower 
Egypt, Upper Egypt would still be open to opposing forces 
aovin? north. See T.->ylor, jSfcCH&Us £2E P. 329n.
D. B. 01Hard maintains that this threat was negligablo* Sea 
“Salisbury*s African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890,11
Si® SasIAgli HjatQ£lcaI S2&SH (October 19&B), aaasto.
Hereafter cited as Gil lard, “Salioaury and Heligoland.ft
of British Paraiita BalLgz from RiU u/.7g/ ^  
(1292) (Cambri;l2Gs At the University Uress, 1'
0222)
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ninety-nine days* When William II came to power, the oppor­
tunity for closer relations with England apparently had van- 
iohed; although the new Kaiser was the grandson of the English 
queen, he had often offended the British people by his brutish 
manners# This, in addition to the hostility shown by many of
*j.0
the German papers, seemed to eliminate any hope for an
Anglo-German agreement* from the beginning of his reign
William apparently had desired closer ties with England, but
he was viewed with suspicion even by his grandmothers
As regards the political relations of the two 
governments [Germany and EnglandJ, the Queen 
quite agrees that it should not be affected (if 
Possible) by these miserable personal quarrels, 
but the Quean much faar.fi that with such a hot­
headed, conceited and wong-headed young man, 
devoid of all feelings LJtfllXiam JIj> that may 
at ANY moment become impossible*^
The now Kaiser*s military advisers began to urge a war 
against Russia, and Russo-German relations began to deteri­
orate almost from the time Williaa assumed control* Bismarck 
strongly opposed William*5 alienation of Russia, but great as 
were the tensions over foreign policy, it was a domestic is­
sue which finally brought the fall of the Iron. Chancellor
hj)
One reason was a thorough distrust of English doctors* 
One had officiated at the birth of William II, who had a crip­
pled arm. Another had opposed an early operation on Frederick 
111*3 throat, against the advice of the Gorman doctors, because 
'the growth was non-malignant. See P. B# Benson, Tjbfi liaise,r 
g.pd English Relations (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 
193^77 p7 p7* Her ©ax ter cited as Benson, Kaiser a.nd Bagilsfo.
Ssla&L
^  The Letters o£ Queen Victoria* ed. George Earle Buckle, 
3rd scries, vol. I (London: jHmKurray, 1932), Wl. Hereafter 
cited as £. 7*
1
2*fr
and concentrated effective power in the hands of the ,fhot- 
headed*1 Kaiser# After a stormy scene on March Si* 1890* 
William received his Chancellorfs resignation# An era in 
German history had ended*
Bismarck almost single-handedly had formed the new em­
pire# He had also shaped a hew Europe and had made Berlin 
the diplomatic capital of the continent# The question was 
raised when Bismarck was released: would his successor* Count 
George Leo von Caprivi, be able to continue the brilliant 
diplomacy begun by the architect of the German Empire?
CHAPTER II
MGLO-GH£MAH HE LAI I OKS, 1890-1896
Count Leo Caprivi and William II maintained that the 
new government would follow the same course as Bismarck In 
foreign affairs. Lord Salisbury, however, felt that the 
change of chancellors would have great repercussions on the 
European scene. The British minister deplored the Kaiser*s 
action in dismissing Bismarck because he realized that he 
would now have to deal with the young ruler* Salisbury 
thought the office of Chancellor would'have much less power 
than it formerly had. Although he believed William to be sin­
cere in his statement that German policy would not change, 
the' Prime Minister asked, **Bven If he [willlam] thinks thus 
today, what guarantee have we that he will not change his
-i
mind overnIght?,,
Salisbury was correct in his assumption that the new 
chancellor would wield less power than Bismarck* “Caprivi 
* * * knew nothing of foreign affairs,H maintains A. J* ?. 
Taylor, “Marschall, the new secretary of state, not much 
more.1*2 As a result the Foreign Office came more and more
n
Tsmpsrley, British gar.etgn Bal-laz. p. W  5.
2 Taylor, Struggle for Mastery* p. 3-53.
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under the control of Friedrich von Holstein* a permanent of­
ficial in the office, and the Kaiser, vho chose to follow a 
more erratic course on. a no mb or of occasions.
Several months after he assumed power, Caprivi announced 
the conclusion of an important colonial agreement in which 
Germany had agreed to cede all claims to concessions in Zan­
zibar and on the island of Pemba to Britain; the latter would 
give up the !iorth Sea island of Heligoland* Germany also ap­
proved a northern border for her colony in eastern Africa; 
this excluded the Reich from Uganda and the sources of the 
Wile* Salisbury agreed to oersua&e the Sultan of Zanzibar to 
sell his coastal claims in East Africa to Germany, thus giving 
Germany the control of the coast as well as the hinterland*
An old Arab proverb maintained that, * If yon play on the 
flute at Zanzibar, everybody as far as the lakes dances;13 
both Germany and Great Britain realised the commercial value 
of the Island* Salisbury pointed out the importance of Zan­
zibar in 1888:
"We have left Prince Bismarck [a] free hand in 
Samoa (and a pretty mess fee has made of it!), but 
we can not do so in Zanzibar. The English and 
Indian interests are both too strong*"
The Iron Chancellor, when In office, had often utilized the
3 Smile de Groot, "Great Britain and Germany In Zanzibarf 
Consul Holmwood1 s Papers, 1886-1887," Tfe^. Journal of Ho,darn 
Hifltarg XOT (dune 1953), 121. Hereafter cited as Groot, 
"Zanzibar".
** Cecil, Salisbury* T7, 23^23? and Temper ley, British
f m i l m  J M M & 9  p *  ^ 3 *
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German interests in Zanzibar to secure concessions elsewheref? 
Caprivi had given up this lever. Bismarck was strongly 
critical of the "Heligoland Agreement!f, as he was with most
of the policies of his successor, and Tainted that if he were
still Chancellor, England herself may h a w  given up Zanzibar:
Free trade with that one great market on the 
Bast .African coast was the bridge for our traf­
fic with the mainland* . . • That the possession 
of this bridge would at some future time devolve 
upon us * * • I had regarded . . * as probable 
enough for such an aim to be regarded • • » as 
a possibility worthy of endeavour*
While this is, of course, a gross over1 statement, it does in­
dicate the value that Bismarck placed on the island which 
Caprivi had given up,
Bismarck himself first sought to secure Heligoland for 
Germany in iBBh whan he attempted to obtain the island in. 
return for Gorman support for the British Egyptian policy.
It appeared in diplomatic conversations several times from 
188^ until Bismarck1s fall, but no agreements wore reached.
The British Prime Minister likewise broached the question of 
Zanzibar on several occasions, but he was firmly refused. 
Despite the close Anglo-German co-operat:! on In the Hear Bast 
in the late 1880*s* Salisbury knew he could never come to an 
agreement with Bismarck over Zanzibar# With the change of 
chancellors, however, the Prime Minister thought he could
'■* Oroot, "Zanzibar1*, p. 122.
Otto von Bismarck, SSH Skaa&2£& 3L S i s m s ^ A  .H3&3r




Cn Key 13. TO205 Lord Salisbury outlined his proposals
for a coorrleto settlement of African problems to the German
B.inbessador *n London, Po.nl non ilatsfellt. The Kaiser soon
became quite olated at the prospect of seeiirkig the North
Sea island* and ho came to regard the Toman Last African
7hoi din on as ba.it for additional concessions* Oarriri felt 
that a. major agreement with Treat Uritain, and/sarticulerly 
the acquisition of Heligoland., would, secure greater support 
for him at home* .He pointed out that Planarek had earlier 
attempted to secure the islsndf he had succeeded*
Despite William1s apparent willingness to sacrifice
Bast Africa (where Germany was losing large amounts of money), 
Hatzfaldt managed to secure additional concessions in Africa. 
Salisbury agreed that German Bast Africa border the Congo 
Free State, since Germany hinted that someday she might want 
to pur elms a 'the Congo region* The English Prime Minister also 
agreed to the cession of the flai^Yiglnjtel» a long narrow 
strip of territory which Jutted northeast from German South-
I
UGst Africa and connected that territory to the Sambesi Hirer* 
The two powers signed the agreement on July I, 1890; this 
date aorhaps marks the zenith of Anglo#*German friendship*
^ Dillard, “Salisbury and Heligoland", p. 653*
8 r. H. Kinsley, "'Ititsrnational Rivalry, 1885-1395," 
Cambridge British S=»i££, III, 27S-?.80, Sontag, GorjmaZ s M  
liSSUM, PP. 270-273, Set:r.-Hats:;n, Si Ba£22£t PP-
C. t' * , and Dawson, German Bapoire* II, 270-271#
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Although both governments were satisfied with the exchanges 
and concessions, the announcement of the provisions stirred 
popular resentment in both Great Britain and Germany* Since 
Germany had received a border common with the Congo Free State, 
England no longer had the opportunity to construct an "all-red** 
route from the Cape Colony to Cairo* The liberals did not 
criticize the concessions, although many objected to strength­
ening the British hold over Zanzibar*^ Even the Queen Quietly 
stated her objections to certain parts of the Agreements 
“That any of my possession should be bartered away causes me
r%
great uneasiness*1*  ^ Bor would it be a favorable comment on 
British justice to turn people over to an ftunscrupulous des­
potic Government like the Germans1 ?%ithout consulting them 
11first. The Queen realized, however, that a plebiscite 
would be out of the question— other peoples controlled by 
England might demand the same privilege* Salisbury vigorously 
defended the agreement by which he had established definite 
boundaries for German territories In Africa and thus had 
limited the threat of future German expansion into British 
lands*^
Although the Kaiser looked with pride upon the agreement 
which he had completed within a few months of Bismarck1s
9 Sontag, Germany. England, p. 271.
10 Cacil, Salisbury. 17, 298.
11 Ibid.
12 See Giilard, "Salisbury and Heligoland," oar,sin.
^ iiftiy Germans wmm favwsMy iml ml* The
German colonial rm^ty bitterly attacked the settlement and 
the femsrnmeat for having fives up toe saach he dbt^ im Hi# 
north £©& island* fh# efforts of the British ministers to 
defend the treaty in Iceland made the task of the Gorman 
gov ■> 'm^ont more difficulty the British people were told that 
the Islam! was worthless#^ As e result, the ncv ehsimellor 
lost* t&xb* * than gained, popular sucpo^t Imosmo of the 
Heligoland agreosant*
C&nrivl opposed colonies oven more strongly than his 
predecessor# Bismarck would support a colonial policy if it 
would benefit his European system, hut O&privi disapproved of 
all forms of colonial activity* wThe worst thing that eouM 
happen to u$p" he asserted, ft would be for someone to give us 
the whole of Africa#*^ Colonies " 1 not "nly crests aer
enemies fop the Reich, they would be economically improfii- 
txfelo*^
Tb,& ]; Earl Fetors declared that by the Kaligol
agrccaent, the German Brno ' re had sacrificed ft%ro kingdoms * 
Witu nmd Uganda, * * .# for a bath tub is. the forth Sea*1^
13 Baasan* JKfcUSfc S M  JaSS&iSll S s M t « »  P. 79.
^  Saataf ( a^samr |f P* 2/2*
>ta««a«r,4gfegR ataaaffi* 2 M & a s t
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Peters1 statements* coupled with Bismarckfs opposition to the
concessions of the Caprivi administration and the popular
feeling for colonial expansion led to the creation of a
colonial society; out of this grew the P&n-Oerman League, an
organisation which gained considerable influence in Germany
IBduring the next decade*
3Tet It was another decision of the Caprivl Government 
which proved more important to the European alignment of 
powers than the Heligoland agreement. Bismarck long had at­
tempted to protect Germany fro© a possible war in which 
Germany would face both Prance and Russia* Through his in­
tricate alliance system, which included the latter, the Iron 
Chancellor had eliminated the threat of a two-front war. When 
the Wear Eastern Question threatened to split Austria and 
Russia, the wily Chancellor concluded unilateral alliances 
with both* Caprivi allowed the Russo-German Treaty to laps®.
The Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, signed on June 18* 
1887, provided that Russia and Germany would maintain neu­
trality in the event of war with a third power, unless Russia 
attacked Austria or Germany attacked Prance. With the ad­
vent of William to the throne in. 1883 there developed a 
definite anti-Russian feeling in Berlin. Growing interest in 
the Ottoman Empire, communications of an economic nature be­
tween Prance and Russia, and the Kaiser’s anti-Russian ori-
18 Nichols* Canrivi Br,a,, pp. 102-103
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19entailon contributed to the now relationship* '
The now Caprivi Government had allowed the Reinsurance 
Treaty to lapse at the suggestion of Friedrich von Holstein, 
who argued that the ambiguity of the treaty would do more 
harm than good if the terms ever became known* At the time 
it seemed that little danger could arise from this action; 
even Bismarck felt that France and Russia, had sufficient ir­
reconcilable differences to forestall any treaty. An error 
in judgment soon became apparent, and the German move initi­
ated o realignment of power and sot the stage for a. division 
of Europe into two opposing camps*
Embryonic tics between France and Russia had begun as 
early as October, 1888, mien France floated a loan of 
500,000,000 francs to Russia. Three months later Russia 
placed a large order for rifles in France•®  The IleligoX
Agreement had are’'.sod Paris to the .possibility that England
ot
had joined the Triple Alliance**” The cession of Heligo­
land to the Fetch gave Germany the responsibility of defending 
the Forth Sea while paving the way for Great Britain to de­
vote all her energies to the Mediterranean. Open discussion 
of Anglo-Italian relations in the British House of Commons
19 Ren® Albrecht-Carrie, A Dioloaatlc His.tox? o£ Eagane 
, $&£L SsaSEa&a s£ Vienna (New Yoifct Harper and Brothers,
, p. 205. Hereafter cited as AXbrecht-Carrio, Bi.plgm,. 
TP" <ihoT*v nf jEnroT—
20 Ibid.. p. 206.
2^  P. H. Hinslsy, "International Rivalry, 1885-189?,H 
«^ jgim:ldg.e Br.xt.lsh Emo xr e% iTl, 270
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led to the disclosure of the first Mediterranean agreement"' 
and brought an even greater distrust of British designs in 
the Mediterranean.
St. Petersburg at first showed apparent indifference when 
France sought closer Franeo-Hussian ties.^3 Delicate negoti­
ations, however, resulted in. the visit of the French fleet to 
the Russian Haval base at Kronstadt in July, 1891. *£he head 
of the Russian Foreign Office, Nicholsi Giers, had attempted 
to maintain ties with 'Germany, but on August 17, 1892, the 
Chiefs of Staff of Russia and France concluded a military con­
vention. This provided that France would assist Russia if 
attacked by Germany or by Germany and Austria together, and 
Russia would support France in the event of a German attack, 
either alone or in conjunction with Italy. Mobilisation by 
members of the Triple Alliance would bring Franco-Ewssian 
mobilisation, and the agreement was to be in effect as long 
as th© Triple Alliance.^
The apparent alignment of Russia with France had brought 
a greater effort on the part of Germany to secure an alliance 
with Great Britain. If th© Reich could conclude such an agree­
ment, the great coalition of Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, 
and Great Britain would deter any overt move on the part of 
France or Russia. The new German Government, however, was less
"a -K i L e *BritRhShft.. ,'Tnt®?“®t^ “®|7|ivalry* 1885-1895, "
Altorseht-Carrta’, Piplomatic History off Surooe. p. 296. 
^  P* 212.
3^
astute than the old, and the expanded British interest in 
colonies, coupled with the British policy of non*Involvement, 
promised to forestall such an agreement.
The fall of the Salisbury Government in .August, 1892, 
brought the aged Gladstone bach into power for the third 
time, but Lord Rosebery, who favored continued friendship 
with Germany, became Foreign Secretary; this move indicated 
that Salisbury1s foreign policy, for the most oart, would he 
continued. The new government could not maintain an aloof­
ness from other nations as Gladstone had attempted in the 
past; some active foreign negotiations were necessary. In a 
memorandum written upon his retirement from office, Salisbury 
declared his views on the European scenes
"The key of the present situation in Europe is 
our position towards Italy and, through Italy 
to the Triple Alliance* . . * If England was to 
become more cold to Italy . . .  or were to give 
any indication of likelihood that she would even 
give a moral preference to Franc© In the event 
of a conflict, I think very serious risks to 
European peace would be run.^as well as to the 
interests of this country.***?
The friendship of the Triple Alliance was important to 'Eng­
land both in Egypt and in the Mediterranean* Rosebery told 
Batzfoldt that there was the possibility that Great Britain 
would act with Italy,"* but the Foreign Secretary, like his
F. B* Kinsley, "'.international Rivalry, .1885-1895*M
OmlQiJrlm Ikitlsk 11 273.
26 Hatzfeldt to Holstein," November- 23, I892, 2&a Hol-
fi&ULa .gaiwES, vol. HI, CorrgspQM.e.nGfi, 1.3.61-1396, Norman 
Bieh and r!» II* Fisher, eds. {Cambridge: At the University 
Press, 3.961}, pp. no. 378. Hereafter cited as
Holstein £aasca»
r'
predecessor, was not ready to ally Groat Britain with any
country, including Italy.^
Valentine Chirol, the Berlin correspondent of The Times.
declared that the elections were not Indicative of the future
British policies. Gladstone himself had lost a great deal of
personal influence, and it was the head of the Radical Party
and a strong imperialist, Joseph Chamberlain, who had gained
during the electionss
1 fchirol] believe the knell of the old narrow- 
minded, Insular Radicalism has been sounded . . .
There will emerge a young h an a c ci-L party under 
Chamberlain1s leadership, as thoroughly Imperial­
ist, etc., as thoroughly conscious of the world
wide rouge of our interests and duties, as the
Conservative party has always shown Itself to 
be.
After the British elections Germany again attempted
to force conclusion of a treaty by suggesting that she
would tarn to Russia. Haizfeldt probably first made this
suggestion to Salisbury, who was out of office, but In a later
letter to Holstein the German Ambassador quoted and endorsed
an earlier opinion that the Franco-Bussian Alliance posed no
threat to Germany*
The alliance between the Russians and Finnica causes 
me no anxiety because I will always keep It with­
in my power to purchase Russia*s neutrality in 
the event of a Fr&ngo-Germ&n war, and we donft 
need anything moro.^
-7 Tamper ley, British Foreign Policy, pp.
^  "Ghirol to Holstein," July 20, 1892, Holstein Papers. 
Ill, lr21-*22, no. 375.
29 «Hatzfeldt to Holstein," November .28, 1892, Hols'
III, lk27> no. 378.
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Hnt^feldi^s optimism over Germany1 s reopening the line 
to St. Petersburg was rudely shattered the next year by fur** 
ther Franco-Russian discussions and agreements. The military 
convention had not yet been formalised into an alliance, but 
as both powers contended with a common enemy— Great Britain—  
it was only natural that the convention would ripen into a 
more permanent arrangement*
Russia had become involved in a. border dispute with 
Afghanistan and sought to extend her domination over much of 
the area. Groat Britain, whose holdings in India were endan­
gered. , immediately protested the action and threatened armed 
intervontion, Faced with this strong British stand Russia
ach.riovrledge d clefoat. and retreated*~
France had likewise become involved In bittor disputes 
with Great Britain. In January9 1393? Gladstone, the old 
non-interventionist, entered Bgypt and prevented the Fhedive 
from establishing an anti-Fnglish government.^ On this oc­
casion Russia failed to bach 'die French protest because the 
tsar, in part, was -disillusioned by tho republican govern- 
raent which had allowed the Panama scandals. The most
s ¥1111 am L. Longer, rh& I>iuloMaey o£ Imerialism* vol*
I (Few York: Alfred A. FnoprJ 193?T, p * 33* Hereaf-ter cited 
as Longer, .Diplomacy of Lane rial ism. See also “Hosebery to 
Queen Victoria,rf August 2H-, 1892• £• 2* &•» 3rd series, II* 
15>1 9*.
si^ For a detailed study of the British policy in Egypt 
see I* B. Hiller,' ftThe Egyptian Question and British Foreign 
Policy, 1892-139^,14 T&e Journal o£ Modern History XXXII (March 
I960), I-!?.
32 Langer, Diplomacy a£ Imperialism. I, 38-39.
acute Anglo-French clash, however, arose In Slam, Both 
powers previously had established extensive claims in southern 
Asia, and it was inevitable that a clash would occur. On 
July 13, 1893* France sent two gunboats up the Mekong River 
to Bangkok and soon thereafter announced a blockade of the 
neutral state. Rosebery quickly protested this action and 
began zo sound out the Triple Alliance for possible assistance. 
Eventually France retreated from the possible showdown, and 
Siam again became a buffer state between French Indo-China 
and British B u r m a .33 Great Britain had won the first tests 
of strength unassisted.
As the ties between Russia and France grew tighter, 
she German opposition to the Caprivi a&ministration became 
more and more outspoken. The pro-BismarckIan press stro ngly 
criticised the new Chancellor for his failure to maintain 
security for Germany in Europe* When the Iron Chancellor 
left office there had been little'possibility of an ententp 
between France and Russia; now there was the definite threat 
of a two front war. Germany eould not trust Groat Britain 
In an ententes only an alliance was possible. If a firm 
agreement were not signed Great Britain would In all prob­
ability precipitate a crisis between the Triple Alliance and 
the Franco-Rus sian combination; she then would retreat into 
her traditional policy of isolation.^
33 p# h . Hinsloy, **International Rivalry, 1885-1895*11 
mbrldge British History. Ill, 278-279.
The tsar previously had been reluctant to permit an al­
liance, but he at last gave way. In October, 1893? Alexander 
permitted a squadron of five ships to visit the '.french Kaditer* 
ranean base at foulin; three months later the two governments 
exchanged letters and the Franco-R u c s1an alliance came into 
effect. The choice of the Mediterranean part gave rise to 
the belief that' the agreement was of an anti-British nature, 
since the Royal Favy was strongest in trie ?Ted:Iterrr.nean•
Russia*s decision to maintain a squadron in the region and 
her.attempts to negotiate a commercial treaty with Turkey
A*?
furdiar strengths' od this idea.
Rosebery sought to enlist the support of the Triple 
Alliance in order to maintain British supremacy in the Mediter­
ranean and keep Russia, from expanding, but Germany was decid­
edly cool to this suggestion. The British Foreign focrotary 
refused to commit England to the Alllahoo.3® Trio Fosslsehe 
argued that
"it ' s untilinlcable that Germany should promise 
to protect India against a Russian attack, or 
to take up her shield if France and Russia at­
tacked the Suez Canal* * * . Russia1s real 
enemy Is not the Triple Alliance— and least 
all Is it G or many— 'England is the real ©nemy.1^
Holstein expressed a similar sentiment in a letter to his
representative in London: **I . . . have no intention of
3? IsKperley, British Foreign "ol.igy. p. 4-71.
3^ See ?. K. Hinsley, "Interna fcional Kiva-lries, 13B>»1895» * 
EMSS. ScjJ&afa History. Ill, 230.
37 sontag, S.armany M  Bag,land, p. 283.
waiting until we [Germany] are left alone with England • ♦ •
38England has simply exhausted the patience of her friends* "
At the same time, in an attempt to improve Russo-German 
relations and perhaps sap the strength of the F^anco-Bussian. 
agreement, Germany concluded a tariff agreement with Russia*3^
Rosebery apparently was undaunted by Germany's move to­
ward Russia and felt that only Greece among the Mediterranean 
countries would side with the tsar? Italy, Austria, Spain, 
and Portugal would be sympathetic to Sngland*w  This support 
could deter Russia from malting a mow through the Straits.
The Franco-Russlan agreement led to sharp British criti­
cism of Gladstone? the basic issue was whether Great Britain 
should increase the size of her navy to cope with the new 
threat in the Mediterranean* The Prime Minister and Sir 
William Hareourt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, opposed a 
large increase in funds for the Admiralty, but the newspapers 
and the Deposition had sufficiently aroused public opinion of 
the danger to British security that Gladstone was obliged to
i» *1
resign. Lord Rosebery moved from the post of Foreign 
Secretary to that of Prime Minister.
3^ “Holstein to Hatzfel&t,'1 December 9, 1893* Holstein 
Pasars« III, M*7, no. 390.
39 Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism. I, 50-56.
1+0 "Hatzfeldt to Holstein," February 28, 189M-.. Hals.te.la 
Papers, ill, h6k~k6$, no. V03.
^  Gladstone maintained that his hearing and eyesight 
had forced him to resign, '•Gladstone to Queen Victoria,"
March 3, I89V, Q. V. L., 3rd Series, II, 371-372. See also 
A. G. Gardiner, TJag, Life of Sir William Barcourt, vol. II,
**•0
In l89*+ there were renewed territorial clashes in Africa 
between Great Britain and Germany. While as late as 1890 the 
Caprivi Government had made large concessions, it now became 
necessary to adopt a more ^forward1* foreign policy in order 
to placate colonial interests at home. The Colonial Society 
increased its efforts to secure immediate action on the 
question of territorial expansion.^ Even many German liberals 
began to see Great Britain as the most formidable rival for 
German activity, and they began to discuss the adoption of 
anti-Eng11sh measures.^3
In November, 18939 Germany and England had agreed on 
the western watershed of the Nile as a line of demarcation 
between the German territory of Kamerun and the English in­
terests in the Sudan. Since Germany had no claims immediately 
west of the line, Great Britain assumed that the Belch would 
occupy the area to which she had renounced her claim and thus 
block France from the Tllle Basin. Germany, however, con­
cluded an agreement with 'France which gave the latter the 
territory which Germany had received from England* As a 
result France again had free access to the Bile ' and could
ill
again threaten the British holdings*1 r
(Londons Constable and Company, 1923), op. 2V+-208. Hereafter 
cited as Gardiner, Hareourt.
Paulina Kalyea Anderson, Tte gaytecaana 3L Anti-Bng-
1.1 sh. Feeling in Germany;* 1890-1902 (Washingtons Th© American 
Un 1 veriityi5r e s s,1939), p. 1781 Hereafter cited as Anderson, 
Anti-English Feeling. For a discussion of the Colonial Soci­
ety* see Ibid.. pp. 177-19^*
^  Taylor, StxiAf.gM £2E Mas too:, pp. 3W-3!*9.
Ibia.» 3 ^ .
Great Britain attempted to circumvent the FVancover­
man agreement by concluding a treaty with Leopold II, King 
of Belgium and owner of the Congo state, Britain leased 
some territory west of the Nile to Leopold in return for a 
strip of land along the eastern border of the Congo Free 
State from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Albert* The latter 
acquisition would reopen the possibility of an "all-red*1 
route from Cape to Cairo, and Leopold’s control of the region 
west of the Nile would keep France from expanding to the 
east (See Map I, p, b2)*
France, as expected, protested the Anglo~Congolese 
Treaty| she had never recognised the British sphere of in­
fluence on the tipper File and had her own designs of crossing 
Africa from west to east. Great Britain, however, did not 
expect the strong German protest* The Heligoland Agreement 
of 1890 had given Germany a common border to the Congo Free 
State; the Anglo-Oongolese Treaty, by which England leased 
a strip of territory along the east border of the Congo 
Free State, had upset the earlier pact, Germany thus had a 
legal argument against the treaty, but because of the recent 
German position, Great Britain did not expect a sudden ■pub­
lic condemnation of her latest African venture. Germany also 
raised the question whether an international body had to 
approve any change of territory of -the Free State, since the 
assembled powers had Initially guaranteed the territory.**-*
**5 Sontag, Ssroaxor &a& England, pp. 287-293.
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rescind the treaty, Marschall, the German Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, oointed out that only by promptly with­
drawn ng could England avoid compliest1 ons*^ Lord Rosebery, 
In a conference with Count Deym, the Austro-Hungarian ambas­
sador to London, declared that Germany should not oush Eng­
land too fart
The style of the German note, though not unusual 
in communications from Berlin, was insufferable 
• * # if Germany were going to side with France 
or appear to side with France in this and other 
African questions, we [Great Britain] must recon­
sider our jpasition as regards our general attitude 
In Europe* '
Despite the stern warnings against interference which 
passed from London to Berlin, the English posit:? on was rather 
tenuous. Sir Edward Balet, the British ambassador in Berlin, 
pointed out that if Eng1and refused to give up the offensive 
nrovi si ons in the Cong o *'■?recount Fr*'re*®* arc1 Ger many could 
withdraw .from their guarantee of Congo neutrality. In ad­
dition to this Germany and France could unite in other mat­
ters, such as Egypt, and precipitate additional crises for
t-') • *  "? f-» V )  r ?
.LJt .1 i c l  U u «
^  Sontag, fcarnffiny Pfocj, England,, p* 29^. rtMarschall to
Batnfeldt,ff June 9, lo9*, M &
iscfoen Kablnette. 1871-191^. Johannes Lepsins, Albrecht Men­
delssohn-3artholdy, and Friedrich Thirnno, eds. (Berlin; 
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Polltik und Geschichte,
I922-I927), Fill, Mf2-!V-f3, no* 20*3. Hereafter cited as £. £
Rosebery to Queen Victoria,** June 13, 189^. 2* F, L* 
3rd series, XI, *0Wf05«
^  'ffalet to Queen Victoria,M June 15, 189^, Ibid,, V)5~
1x0*7
Germany soon withdrew her demand for the complete ab­
rogation of the treaty, although France continued to exert 
oressure on both Great Britain and the Belgian monarch*
On August l*f Leopold acceded to the French demand and with­
drew from the agreement with England* Anglo-German relations, 
however, had already been seriously damaged* Berlin had 
sought to exert pressure on London in order to gain conces-* 
sions, such as closer support of the Triple Alliance and 
a greater influence in Samoa and probably %ould rather have 
been paid for withdrawing her opposition than be forced to 
insist on if. This policy had again failed*
Forced to retreat from the ^ongo, Rosebery turned to­
ward Paris and St. Petersburg in an attempt to discuss the 
Afghan border dispute with Russia and settle Anglo-French 
colonial problems* The Prime Minister did not intend to 
conclude an agreement with the Dual Alliance, for France and 
Russia ware ^natural enemies14 of England. These were genuine 
problems and Rosebery wanted to solve them* Of course, there 
is always the possibility that Rosebery aspired to play 
Germany1s game— by negotiating with the Dual Alliance, Ger—
CV)
many would recline the value of England1 s friendship. *■'
. L.t, .i- v* *. *.w*. v .1* st.X4jL.jL. - .1 v X x  Jr j 4* w  J m  X  v J y J  j
Cambridge British Empire. Ill, 285. See also Taylor, Strug*
zla. sax yi&stexzt p V  3W-35V.
*° Hinslejr, loc. ei£,, pp. 285-239, Gardiner, Hgrcour.t 
pp. 321-326, hanger, fllpiogiacy o£ imperialism. I, 1S5- I W V
See also Taylor, Struggle for Hestary. op# 351-3o'?.
As r result of the ^ongo action, Germany and England 
be canid nor© and more astranced* The next mar 11" © Retell 
refused to join Britain in intervening in the Sino-Japanese 
War, although it later intervened in co-operation with Russia# 
Many English newspapers reported that Germany was serving 
Russia, and one mentioned that It was either wthe sudden im­
pulses of Germany8s ruler81 or a 18perverse desire to do the 
opposite of whatever is done or favored by Great Britain,11 S*- 
which dictated the German action# After Shimonosoki Great 
Britain ended, her attempts at collaboration with France and 
Russia and retreated from continental affairs# The affront 
to British pride which the Kaiser made in January, 1896, fur­
ther isolated Great Britain and brought .Anglo-German relations 
almost to the breaking ooint.^2
Germany had shown interest in the Transvaal region over 
since she began her colonial activity in 188*** but Bngland 
had effectively prevented her from making strong ties with 
the Boer Republic# Great Britain controlled the territory 
around the Transvaal with the exception of the land to the 
east which was govern®& by Portugal (Be© Map II, p. **6). 
Mozambique, or Portuguese Rost Africa., thus had acquired a 
value far in excess of what it might have had*
^  JhS. 9 ija d » for 11 26, 1895, quoted in Or on James
Hale, B M J M M  B M nS ^ s m s x  HJJsJl £2 m
■]. and, spiff ev f otkTvV h^ pplet on-Century
Company, I9W ) ,  p# .10*?# Hereafter cited as Hale, Piyol.ilq.lt; 
Mid Oioloaaov#'
f r  ■ {■. H. Hinslay* "International Blvalry. 1885—1895," 
SaakEkaaa jfeltdah fiaaisa, m ,  285.
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In 1B91 Cecil Rhodes, the English 1 userlallst, attempted
to purchase the entire 'Fzambicu© terrltory5 Portugal cpu ebly
rejected hie offer* She also turned down Germany1s offer to
err chase the Delagoa fay-Pretoria HalXvay, even though she
*5Uwas in dire financial straits.
The London Con vent 1 on of 188** had in oiled that the Boer 
Republic was under British suzerainty, hut In January* 1395, 
President Kruger declared that the Transvaal was indeognrlont• 
The next month he sir no cl a treaty with ";ortuyal, and In 
August of the some year he concluded an agreement with Hol­
land* Germany approved the President1s action, although
55Greet Britain refused to recognise either agreement*
As a useu.lt of the ■increasingly important roles played 
by the .few Gorman industrialists in the Trcnsvsal, Cape 
Colony officials sought to strengthen their waning Influence 
by more direct and forceful means. In the latter sort of 
December, 1895, Dr* T,* S. J© me son led a band of adventurers 
into the T'ransvaal In order to assist a planned ITitlunder 
uprising. Vo simultaneous revolt occurred, and the Tr&ns-
gu.
C* D* Fenner, “Germany and the Transvaal Before 1896,M 
The Journal of Modern Hi star..7 XII (March 19**0), 36-37, -^7* 
Hereafter cited as Fanner, “Germany and Transvaal.’1 See 
also Cecil He&dlam, TIi^  Hilper Papers, (Londons Cassell and 
Company, Ltd., 1931), IT? 3, 32. Hereafter cited as Headlaffi,
MIMm. EMmj.*
?? Fenner, “Germany and Transvaal.,11 p. 52. Se© also 
John Doan, Blehford and C cl gar !?• Johnson. “The Contemplated 
Anglo—German Alliance, 1890-1901,n The. Political Science 
Quarterly XL11 (March 1927), 15. Hereafter cited as Bick­
ford, 11 Anglo-German A11 lance.11
vaal authorities, previously informed of the planned raid, 
easily captured the band*
Since Jameson had organised the expedition in British 
Bechuanaland, both the Boer and the German Governments ac­
cused Britain of instigating the "filibustering campaign.*1 
Lord Salisbury, who had become Prime Minister in June, 1895, 
informed Hatsfeldt that Great Britain did not approve of th© 
raid, and the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, also 
denied any foreknowledge of the expedition. He had even at­
tempted to recall Jameson before he learned whether the ex­
pedition was successful.^
Germany's re-entry into the colonial field after the 
dismissal of Caprivi, William's desire to- build Germany into 
a strong naval power, and the renewed nationalistic fervor 
all seemed to propel Germany into a policy of Weitoolit.Ik * ^ 7 
It was at this moment that the Jameson Bail occurred, and 
the Kaiser sent his famous congratulatory telegram to Pres- 
ident Kruger. William at first sought more drastic meas­
ures, perhaps as the result of a rebuff which he had experi­
enced in England earlier that y e a r , his Chancellor,
In reference to the part played by the English Govern­
ment see A. F. Madden, "Changing Attitudes and Widening Res­
ponsibilities, Caaflffil&gfl Brij&gh Kt&torv. HI, 357-360, J. L. 
Garvin, The 3j»ife of Joseph ChamberlainTLondonz Macmillan and
Co., Ltd., 193W xiI7TC-90*  lS5iafter cited as Garvin,
Chamberlain, and Longer, Diplomacy of Imperialism. I, 23$-2^0.
Anderson, Anti-English Feellag, pp. 232-233.
68 See Langer, tttnloaaey a£ JmvaxAalXam* I, 237.
Holstein gaaara. vol. I, Ifeaotrs, pp. 160-161.
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Hohenlohe, and Ma.rs.chal!, the Secretary of State, dissuaded 
him from this action*
The Kruger telegram aroused public opinion in both 
Germany and England. German newspapers, almost without ex­
ception, hailed the Kaiserfs communique,^ and the English 
newspapers were just as outspoken in their denunciations of 
German ambitions*^ The Kaiser*s reference to the indepen­
dence of the Transvaal was quite offensive to the British, 
and his decision to send assistance to the Boers through 
Portuguese territory was even more upsetting. English news­
papers denounced the entire German action as part of a pre­
meditated plot against England which only required an inci­
dent to he put into effect. Chamberlain called for an "act 
of vigor"against Germany.
Great Britain became more and more estranged from Ger­
many during 1896, despite a further German effort to conclude
6la secret alliance, and a torrent of anti-German publications 
poured from the British press* Many saw the German effort .as 
part of a growing piox against British manufactured items*
Germany again had attempted to force England into turning
60 Anderson, MU-gB&Ufift gSUQJM,* PP« 233-233.
6!
Hale, Publicity a M  Diplomacy, pp. 11, 117-10. See
particularly Thb rLondon) Tlsqes f lanuarv ‘t, 6, 9.
62 Garvin, Q h m k m M U 1$ I T T > 95.
"Salisbury to Queen Tietorla," January 12, 1896,
£* V. X,., 3rd Series, III, 20-21*
Langer, Diplomacy a£ Imperialism. I, 2h2-sk6.
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toward the Alliance, but she again had failed* The Kruger 
telegram had aroused a strong national pride in a growing 
navy* an expanding Empire, and a rich South Africa* f,U it lander,** 
,f0elagoa Bay,M and "Kruger,H became household words; they 
whetted the interest and excited the imagination of all* The 
German threats had not turned British interests from Africa, 
but rather they had strengthened them* In both northern and 
southern Africa England expressed her determination to main* 
tain her hold* Within two years of the telegram, which was 
perhaps the nadir of Anglo-German relations, a mutual desire 




Th© discovery of gold and diamonds in southern Africa 
had intensified European interest in th© new continent* Al­
though British influence was quite strong in South Africa, 
the Transvaal rendered complete control an impossibility*
Great Britain sought to secure the last non-British ter­
ritory surrounding the Boer Republie~Portuguese Mozambique.
for many years there had existed a strong bond of friend­
ship between England and Portugal. The spirit of amity dated 
from 1373 when Edward II of England and Ferdinand I of Por­
tugal announced a covenant of mutual support. Oliver Crom­
well, Charles IX, and others added to the provisions until the 
first agreement had become a full alliance.
In I8l7 England and Portugal signed an agreement which 
recognized as Portugalfs the territory fro© Cape Delgado to 
the Bay of Lorenzo Marques. Th© territory acquired a greater 
importance as interest rose in South Africa, and since the 
two powers had not precisely defined "Bay of Lorenzo Marques," 
there arose disputes over the extent of the Portuguese posses­
sions. England increased her efforts to secure Delagoa Bay in 
an attempt to end the supply of guns smuggled in through the 
port and given to the natives* Falling to reach agreement
52
over the territory, both countries referred the matter to the 
arbitration of President Mad? ah on of France. During the de­
liberations Great Britain proposed that the nation in whose 
favor the arbitration was decided would not sell any of the 
disputed territory without giving the initial opportunity to 
purchase the land to the nation which lost the decisions to 
this Portugal readily agreed. On July 28, 1875? MacMahon 
announced his decision in favor of Portugal; Great Britain 
abided by the decision and withdrew her claim to the area**
In February, I08*f, ostensibly In accord with the Anglo- 
Portuguese entente although it was actually an attempt to 
prevent French expansion, Great Britain recognised an old 
(and reluctant) Portuguese claim to the mouth of the Congo 
Blver. Soon after this Germany entered the ranks of the 
African colonial powers, and in accord with Franco, forced 
England to give up her recognition of Portuguese ownership.
There were so me in Portugal who objected to giving up 
the Portuguese claims to the mouth of the ^ongo; they at­
tributed the cancellation of the Anglo-Fortuguese treaty of 
18S*f to English indifference rather than International dif­
ficulties. Perhaps, some argued, Portugal should not have 
tied herself so closely to England; Germany seemed to be 
the "rising star•51 Partly in an effort to chow opposition 
to Great Britain Portugal expressed,a willingness to construct
x Raymond ¥» B.lxLer, "Anglo-Portuguese ‘Rivalry for Dela- 
goa Bay," The Journal, of Modern lilsbprv TJ (December 1931*), 
k*2p,
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th© oft-proposed Pretoria-Delagoa fay fallway. This would 
divert mere Transvaal goods from th© Cap© Colony to the Por­
tuguese port. In March, 1887, Colonel Edward McMnrdo, a 
citizen of the United States, formed a. company In London 
with a capital of 4500,000. Construct:!on began in tbs sum­
mer, and it was almost completed in November of the following 
year. In June, IS89, the Portuguese Government seised the 
railway for not having completed the line to the appointed 
terminus within the contract period. The United States and 
Great Britain both demanded that their citizens be compen­
sated « th the antumn of I.890 the three 9oyer nmonts aereed
that three Swiss jurists should determine the amount of com-
o
oensetion due the stockholders.^
There were additional Anglo-Portuguese difficulties
beginning in November, 1389. Portugal had sought to secure
territory from the east to the west coasts In southern
Africa linking her 'two holdings of Angola and Mozambique, but
Great Britain assarted her own Interests In the area. On
January 11 the British minister In Lisbon was told to demand
that Portugal withdraw her claim from central Africa. If
Portugal refused the British minister’s request, he was to 
%
leave Lisbon. Portugal withdraw her claim.
2 Montague George Jessett, 2 M  M g  12 Mrl-O.ai
(new Yorki New Amsterdam Book Company, 1899), 
ppV 116-121* Hereafter cited as Jessett, Dolauoa Bqy.
3 H. 7. Livermore, History of Portugal (Cambridges
At the University Press, 19W)f Hereafter cited
as Livermore, Porti
9 *
Soon after Portugal retreated in central Africa, the For* 
tuguese Government placed an AngXo-Portuguese agreement 
before the Cortes for ratification. Under the terras of the 
agreement Portugal would construct a railroad from Fungive 
Bay to the British sphere of influence and also would promise 
not to cede certain territories f%i. thout the consent of Great 
Britain.tr The Lisbon press waged a strong battle against 
the agreement and declared that it virtually established a 
British protectorate over Uosambigue* Although Portugal was 
to finance the railroad, only Great Britain would benefit.
The British offer to change the wording of the agreement did 
not lessen the violent opposition, and the members of the 
Cortes shouted down the proposal.
Portugal soon faced another most difficult problem.
During the estrangement from England, Portugal raised her 
taxes by six per cent. Despite this effort to balance the 
budget, the deficit for 1891 amounted to mere than one tenth 
of the entire budget. The government curtailed public works 
projects, trimmed governmental staffs, and reduced the pay 
of officials. It soon became apparent that the government 
could not even pay the interest on the external debt. Outsid­
ers began to demand a hand in the adv nistration. Additional 
taxes only caused unrest in the larger towns. Burnerous in-
h t t A i la b  s M  Is s s ls a  Siafea ja m a a . m x i r r  (London»
Harrison and Sons), d9-90. It was not until June 11, 1091, 
that the two countries signed an agreement defining their 
respective spheres of influence in Africa. The later agree* 
raent was substantially the same as the one first proposed.
surrection$ in Portugal1s African possessions caused a further
9drain on the national treasury*
Many felt that Portugal was on the verge of revolution* 
Hie tsar discussed the menacing situation in Spain, Portu­
gal, and Italy; Salisbury anti the German ambassador to London, 
Paul von Katafel&i, considered the problem of a possible
republican revolution in Portugal and the future of the Por~
, * -» , 6'GugussQ co:..on:ia.i possessions.
Germany, in particular, was concerned about the Portu­
guese problem;
A Portuguese republic, which would soon be fol­
lowed by a Spanish Republic, would constitute well 
nigh the greatest political danger to the Triple 
Alliance, and to each separate somber of It, most 
especially to us[GormanyJ» It would not only 
deliver France from any anxiety about Spain, but 
would also inevitably canoe the entire peninsula 
to depend on her,- would give the French" fresh 
courage to attack us and might touch off another 
war. 7
On March 18, 1891, the German Foreign Office instructed 
Hatzfeldt to warn England against acquiring the Portuguese 
colonial empire In the eastern part of Africa. Salisbury 
gave Hatsfeldt the impression that Great Britain would b© 
willing to reach an agreement over the Portuguese colonies.
The next day Hatzfeldt inquired whether he should take part 
in negotiations concerning the partition of the Portuguese
^ G, P. White, 4 .Century of SaaiQ .ana Portugal. 178S- 
1898 (Londons .Methuen & Co., 1909J, op. 3?0-3p .  Hereafter
cited as White, Spain and Portugal.
colonial .possessions| the 3ornan Foreign Office agreed. When 
Hatzfeldfc mentioned Germany’s interest *n securing the Por­
tuguese possessions on the cart coast of Africa, 3a 1- sbury 
rsnlled, “slQEa, aivlaons."8
T-far sc hall, however, later declared that Germany’s main 
Interest was the preservation. of the monarchy in Portugal, 
not the division of colonies. Although he could not aequies© 
in the partition of Portuguese colonies, Marschali declared 
that he would not refuse the British owned islands of Zanzi­
bar and Pemba as compensation for German assistance. Should 
England refuse to take Germany’s interests Into account,
Harschall declared, Germany could always turn to France and
0
exert pressure against Egypt.
On Parch PI, 189-1} Hat&foldt declared that
If the Portuguese monarchy should fall, the only 
remaining possibility was a Spanish entry into 
Portugal and its subsequent annexation by Spain, 
together with an .Anglo-German agreement on the 
future of the Portuguese colonies.^
The Wilhelmstrasse although stressing its desire to maintain
the Portuguese monarchy, wanted to secure British support
for a Spanish annexation if the monarch were overthrown.
This,' it was felt, would prevent a series of Republican
revolutions from again sweeping the continent. The British
Prime Minister refused to even consider this proposal and




declared that he would rather sacrifice Egypt for an .Anglo* 
French alliance than support a monarchical alliance against 
Portugal
Both Great Britain and Portugal agreed that Germany 
should arbitrates their Bast African dispute# Katsfeldt 
served as moderator in the London negotiations between the 
Portuguese representative, the Marquis Luis de Several, and 
the British Prise Minister, and he no doubt interjected his 
Government1s ideas into the proceedings# On June 11, 1891, 
the two powers signed a treaty which ended the Bast African, 
border dispute and ended the threat of renewed anti-English 
viol erica in Portugal*
Further financial difficulties plagued the Portuguese
government. Foreign 'bondholders blocked several attempts
to reduce the external debt, and it was riot until late 1892
that some confidence was temporarily restored. ¥hen it
became necessary to raise taxes again, the Cabinet was over- 
l pthrown. At the same time the clerical problem again came 
to the fore in Portuguese politics, as King Carlos, whose 
extra g avarice and licentiousness had caused many of the domes­
tic problems, suppressed certain clerical opponents. The 
Pope even intimated that he would not receive the Catholic 
king if he came to Home. By 1895 the situation had become 
so serious no to warrant the government's rule by decree.
11 Holstein Parers. 37k.
12 Li'.'or nor o, p. 0+5.
The government reduced the franchise and the number of dele- 
gates in the Cortes* J Further colonial unrisings put an 
added strain on the budget as the Lisbon Government dispatched 
more troops and supplies to Africa. Hie undeveloped colonies 
were a great liability, but the Portuguese officials were 
violently opposed to any proposal concerning the alienation of 
the colonial possess ions.
Cecil Hhodes had attempted to purchase the southern 
portion of Mozambique on several occasions between 1391 and 
1897, but each time he failed. As foreign banking interests 
were concernod over Portugal1s possible financial collapse, 
it was natural that the British would attempt to tie the two 
questions together. If Portugal would either cede Mozambique 
in return for a cancellation of part of the debt or accept 
a loan with the revenue of the colonies as security, both
7 h.
Great Britain and Portugal would have solved major problems. 
Portugal would have reduced her debt, and Great Britain would 
have eliminate the Transvaal as a threat in South Africa.
In early Miy, 1397, Joseph Chamberlain suggested to the 
Marquis de Several, who had become the Portuguese minister In 
London, a possible Anglo-°ortuguese agreenae rat xn South Africa 
in which England would guarantee Portugal * s African posses­
sions if Portugal would prohibit every country access to the 
Transvaal, except by the railway. Both the railway and the
white, Bmin a,nd Portugal, p. 3?1.
^  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism. I, 520.
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port would be operated by an Anglo-Por tugues© Company, which 
would Improve the facilities and provide money for a settle­
ment of damages awarded by the Swiss panal of judges meeting 
in Bern, The Colonial Secretary also suggested that Portu­
gal raise a loan in London using her colonies, the railway,
and the general revenues as security for the British ter-
15ritorial guarantoos,
Several fait that the concessions on the part of his 
government wore too groat. Ho doubt his government would ac­
cept a ‘British loan using all the African colonies except 
Lorenzo Marques as security, but it would never accept the 
possibility of losing all her colonics in the event of a 
default on the loan. The question of accepting British ap­
proval be is jl* 3 or tugal could grant any concession Several 
also rejected, since "it would detract from the sovereign 
rights of Portugal and would be rejected by the Cortes and 
public opinion.ft^
A new government came to power in Portugal shortly after 
the beginning of the Several-Salisbury conversations over 
the Portuguese finances and African colonies. As there was 
concern over the British desire for expansion in South Af­
rica, the Portuguese Liberal Government decided to terminate
3-5 "Memorandum by Mr. Bertie on England and Portugal in 
Africa." May X* 1893, Iritis o& QrjUina a! i M
War. 1898-191^. G. P. Gooch and Harold Teraperley, eds, (Lon- 
dons M s  Majesty*s Stationery Office, 1926-1933), I, ^5, no. 
65. Hereafter cited as B. ]>*
16 JMi.* ^5-W.
the discussions, in place of a renewed growth of Anglo­
phobia, however, there grew a definite fear of the German
iMjaaIA.fcys»17
The Portuguese Government was quite wary of attempts 
to secure her African colonial possessions* Germany and 
Great Britain, the nations whose colonies bordered the Por­
tuguese African, possessions, were particularly suspect* The 
stoning of a German consulate in Mozambique in December, 1896, 
brought strong protests from Germany, and although the mat­
ter was settled peacefully, it did bring cooler relations
*1 O
between Germany and Portugal* The, Tines later described the 
continuing incidents between the Portuguese civilians and 
the German nationals in Mozambique as "assuming an alarming 
form.
During the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations of 1397 it 
appeared to Germany that the conferences would lead to a 
rapprochement over southern Africa* Such an agreement could 
isolate the Boer Bepublic and further jeopardise the German 
investment in South Africa. Since the Reich had already as-
OCisisted the Transvaal through armaments and had given moral
T7 Livermore, Portugal * p. Vls*5. The German Government 
recalled Derenthail, the German Minister in Lisbon, for having 
not sufficiently supported German interests during the Anglo- 
Portuguese discussions, Anderson, Anti-Sngilsh Feeling, p* 225-
^  Tho (London) Times. December 16, 1096.
19 Ibid. - .T"-!-r 1PQ7.
The value of Gorman war materials Imported by the 
Transvaal through Delagoa Bay amounted to sore than 4250,000 
in 1897. Headlam, W d m L  I» 2*tl-2*fr2.
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support to President Kruger, it became necessary to formu­
late a policy for South Africa in the event London and Lis­
bon reached accord over Mozambique. Hatzfeldt urged an 
tag lo—German. agreement in which Germany would receive ter­
ritorial compensation if Great Britain attacked the Trans­
vaal* The' German ambassador received the impression from 
Salisbury that Germany and England could reach an agreement 
over the Transvaal if the price were not too high and also 
that there could he a possible arrangement over the Portu-
pt
guese c olonies*
In June, X897, Count Bernhard von Buelow replaced Baron 
von Msrschall as Secretary of State; he soon began to press 
for an increased navy which he said was necessary to protect
pp
Germany’s increased trade an 0ommerc0* ~ The falser also 
wanted a stronger navy, but he saw it primarily as a poten­
tial instrument of rivalry with Great Britain. Although 
William still entertained hopes of a solid Anglo-German al­
liance, there is evidence that he took some pleasure in 
antagonizing Great Britain. Regardless of the motives for 
naval, expansion, it became obvious that Germany needed ad­
ditional coaling stations for her proposed navy. Since 
Germany held some of the Portuguese debt, it was possible
^  Longer, BiD.lom.acv of Imperialism. I, ?2I. 
po
w Benson, Kaiser English Relations, p. I3I. Bern- 
hard von Suelow, Memoirs of Mrlnee yon Buelow, Mol. I, . T-om
.Secretary a£ 3tqie to .Iwrsri.al Chanc.ell^F, l W 7 -:i903- F. A.
Voigt, trans* (Boston? Little, Broun, and Company, I93D ,  
pp. 60, 120, 222-227. Hereafter cited as Buelow, Memoirs *
Benson, Kaiser Baalish Relations, p. 132.
that she could seise Portuguese territory--Azores, Madeira, 
Capo Terde, St. Thomas, Angola, Mozambique, Macao, and Timor—
ok
as coaling stations.
The Portuguese debt steadily increased during 1897, 
while, at the same time, the government became less suspicious 
of British designs on. her colonies. In March, 139&, the Bern 
Commission announced the results of a preliminary investiga­
tion of the value of the railway which Portugal had seized in 
1889* Although both sides immediately filed ^observations*1 
to the decision, it was apparent that the final award would 
be much greater than £*255,000, the value of the construction 
at the time of its seizure."*^ As Portugalf s debt continued 
to mount, it became necessary to reopen negotiations for 
financial assistancef Portugal again turned to Great Britain.
The terms under consideration for an Anglo-Portuguese 
loan in 1893 were substantially the same as those of the 
previous year. Lisbon sought a loan of &8,000,000 at three 
per cant interest. This would provide funds for paying off 
the floating debt and still leave a sufficient amount for the 
Bern Award. In exchange for this Portugal would agreed to 
the joint management of the railway in Mozambique and Delagoa
^  tfMemorandum by Hr • Bertie on lung land and Portugal In 
Africa,n m y  1, 1898, £. 2 ., I, **6, no. 65.
^  Jessett, Delayoa Bay, pp. 120-123* The investigating 
commission placed the value of the concession, as of December 
31, 1896, at LI,800,000. It is interssting to note that 
Great Britain and the United Gt&tes sought no raise the award 
byLL,000,000, Ibid.. pp. 122, 12 -^f.
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Bay and would make no further concessions to other countries 
without British consent* Great Britain would be allowed to 
use all Portuguese ports as coaling stations during war, 
and, above all, she would receive temporary control of Bela- 
goa Bay and .the railway in the event of hostilities in the 
Transvaal*^ By May, 209®, Great Britain and Portugal- seemed 
close to agreement, but as additional obstacles presented 3 
themselves, the Portuguese adopted a more cautious attitude 
in the negotiations for the loan*
20 Garvin, Chajmhar'Iq^ i'.-.I, 310-311.
CHAPTER IV
BIHGLAHD, GkRMAEY, MID TIB PORTUGUESE LOAN
In the latter part of 109? Germany again bod the op­
portunity to demonstrate her colonial aspirations* When the 
Chinese attacked a German missionary station at Y@n-chu-fu 
in Shantung, the WiIhelastra s s e had an excuse for interven­
tion. In November, 1897, Germany seised Xiao-Ghow ostensibly 
in retaliation against the murder of the two missionaries! 
the real reason, however, was in accord with a Weitr, ol.ltIk 
motive* ’'Germany, tf as A. J* P. Taylor so antly describes the 
incident, Tln8<3dad a coaling-station for her non-existent 
fleet— and thereafter a fleet to protect her coaling-station. 
The Falser, who had become fasc‘ noted by the Intricacies of 
a strong navy, naturally supported the German action in the 
Far Bast.2
The growing concern over the German naval preparations 
caused Great Britain to seek a great accord for her far- 
flung Interests, She offered to settle Anglo-Eussian prob­
lems in Asia In February, 1893, but was rebuffed« Since
1 Taylor, .'Struggle J&x Mastery, p. 375.
2 "William to Buelow," November 7, 1897, fl, £., XTV (Part 
1), 69-71, no. 3690. German Olplomatle .PocumentsT 1871-191^-. 
B. T. S* Dugdale, trans* and ed.(Hew York: Harpers and 
Brothers, Publishers, 1930), 111, 15. Hereafter'cited as 
■Dttgdale, g. D. 0.
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there appeared to be little hop© of limiting Russian expan­
sion in Asia through an Anglo-Russian understanding* Great 
Britain turned to Germany*^ The next month Great Britain and 
Germany collaborated on a loan to China. If the two countries 
could co-operate on a small scale * some argued, could not 
the post-Jameson animosities be suppressed in order to secure 
the long-awaited Anglo-German entente? Soon Hatzfeldt, Salis­
bury* and Chamberlain opened discussions in an attempt to 
reach a closer understanding between the two countries*
There is some confusion as to which side opened negoti­
ations and. declared itself in .favor of an agreement* It is 
an important question, since the historian’s interpretation 
of the later negotiations, desends on his view of the begin­
nings* Although Germany had long sought ties with Great 
Britain, the Kaiser had often made such a policy quite dif­
ficult. Friedrich von Holst©In, the leading figure in the 
German Foreign Office, and Alfred von Tirpitz, the father of 
the Germany* navy, were both skeptical of ties with Great 
Britain. Katzfel&t cautiously favored an agreement, but the 
secretary of the German Embassy in London, Baron von Bck- 
hardstein was wholly In favor of an alliance* When the lat­
ter discussed the question of an Anglo-German agreement with 
the Kaiser, he found a strong supporter* Boon returning to 
London, Ackardstein suggested that the Colonial Secretary 
bring up the question of an alliance with Hatzfeldt# Since
3 "Nicholas II to William II," May 22, 1898, g. P.,
XIV (Part 1), 250-251, no. 3 8 0 3 . Dugdale, G. £.' , Til, 20n.
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BekarGstein had informed neither Katnfeldt nor BueXov about 
hms jL-i.02? c*‘Oir<ror sa.t-!. ■.':ii vv-.- Go c*n© jur-L --u. Oiiia- L Secretary?
'the German officials reported' that England had initiated the 
discussions#
Germany had 'Whetted the British appetite for an alliance, 
although Great Britain did not need much prodding. Com Paul 
Kruger1s re-election by so large a majority on February 10, 
1398, made an Anglo-Boer conflict appear imminent, and Sir 
Alfred Hilrter, the British high commissioner in South Africa, 
reported arms build-up, which included the emplace­
ment of four large Krupp guns and the investment of over 
41,pOO,000 on forts in the Johannesburg area. At the same 
time the Boer Government called for a volunteer army of oyer 
10,000 and required ©very burgher to hold over 500 rounds of 
ammunition." Since Germany was assisting in military prepar­
ations in th© Transvaal and German officers commanded the 
artillery, Great Britain was forced to take steps to reduce 
the threat of a. German-Boar combination in South Africa*
There is no doubt that Chamberlain sought an Anglo- 
German rapppoc.li©pent at this time; he soon favored an alli­
ance. The Colonial Secretary declared that Germany and
Langer^Diglogacy1 of jaaar.taltam._II. 501-502._Garvin,
Chamber lain. XIT7 "255^27“ Dagdale, 2*'2* £•» XU, 21. It
appears likely, however, that Holstein and the German Foreign 
Office were encouraging Eckar&stein to prod Chamberlain Into 
an alliance. The Holstein Papers on this period had not been 
released when this thesis was submitted.
^ f,Milner to Hr s. Qaskell,rf June 22, 1 8 9 8 , Milnep Papers, 
I, 3kl-Sb2.
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England had the same basic interests, and if the two powers
could reach a general agreement, the colonial differences
would solve themselves* Great Britain could no longer
maintain a policy of isolation. Chamberlain* according to
Hatssfeldt* wished quickly to conclude a binding agreement
£
between England and the Triple Alliance* '
Although Germany first raised the question of an alli­
ance, she was in no hurry to reach an agreement. England 
needed Germany more than Germany needed England. The Wil­
helms trass e saw the opportunity of expanding the Triple Al­
liance into a Quadruple Alliancef perhaps she could also 
extract additional, concessions. In the meantime it would 
be better to forestall the conclusion of an alliance.
Hatz.felclt, armed with instructions from the Wilhelm- 
strasse, met with Chamberlain on April 1, 1898f he presented 
his government1s object ions to an alliance* The British 
parliamentary system would make England a most unstable 
ally, for a new government easily could overthrow a previous 
agreement. As a result of her system of government, England 
could give no assurances of a continuity of policy. Buelow 
also suggested in his instructions to Hatsfeldt that it 
might be wiser for Germany to attempt to eliminate the dan­
ger of the Dual Alliance through agreement with Russia than 
to try to oppose the Alliance by a show of strength in an
6 "Hatzfeldt to Buelow," March 29, 1898, a. P., XIV 
(P&rt 1), 196-199, no. 3 7O2 . Oarvin, Chamberlain."!!!. 260- 
261.
entente with England*^
The Colonial Secretary, in defending his proposal, 
pointed out that a British Parliament had never repudiated a 
treaty concluded by an earlier parliament* On the other 
hand, governments ruled by a single individual, such as Rus­
sia, often altered thair policy with every change of the 
head of stats* At this conference the Colonial Secretary 
also told Hatzfeldt that when ho spoke of English support 
for an Anglo-German alliance, he was speaking only for him­
self | be could not speak for his colleagues#®
An April 3rd dispatch from the VJiihelmstr&sse was dis­
tinctly cool toward an Anglo-German alliance. There could 
never be an alliance between England and Germany, it argued, 
because the former had democratic institutions^ the English 
public would never allow an agreement. Likewise* the Ger­
man people would be opposed to an Anglo-German connection, 
because England*s continued attempts to expand her influence 
in colonial affairs kept Germany*s population in a definite
n
anti-English mood.''
Two days later, in a. dispatch to the Chancellor, Hatzfeldt
/ “Buelow to Hatzfeldt,” March 30, 1098, G. P., XIV
(Part 1), 199-202. no* 3783, Garvin, Chamberlain«~TTI« ?S1- 
262#
Q
“Chamberlain1 s Second lienor endun,M Apr.il 1, 1890, 
Garvin, Chamberlain* III, 263-266.
5 "Buelow to Hatzfeldt," Anril 3, 1 8 9 8 , <5. £. XT7 
(Part 1), PCA-P.O?, no. 373?. See nlrc- "I^sc&lleo to Palls- 
bury,11 February 1, I89O, B. P., I, G-B-Ab, no, 63.
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said that Sir Arthur Balfour, the acting Foreign Secretary 
during the illness of Lord Salisbury, agreed with his argu­
ment s against the Anglo-German alliance* The two also 
agreed that the best way to achieve closer connections be­
tween the two countries was to remove the ill-feeling between 
them by
an accommodating attitude of both Governments in 
small questions and to prepare public opinion 
both here and in Germany for a possible future 
politica.l rapproehement*
The statement summarises the actions ox the two ^governments, 
particularly Great Britain, during the succeeding months*
On April 10 the Kaiser presented his views of the pur­
poses of the Anglo-German negotiations to the Foreign Office. 
It is an analytical and accurate statement of the policy 
which Germany was to follow in her negotiations with Eng­
land s
It is of great importance to keep official senti­
ment in England favourable to us and hopeful* A 
friendly-minded England puts another card against 
Kussia in our hands, as well as giving us the pro­
spect of winrh rxg1 from England colonial and commer­
cial advantages.
It would be Hatzfeldt1s duty, continued William, to put
off the conclusion of a formal alliance, not by 
a rejection wounding to English feeling but so 
as to manifest a cordial wish for beneficent co- 
oneration*
3-0 {,Hotzfeldt to Hohenlohs,tf Aoril 7, 1899, 0. P. 
(Part 1), 211, no. 3788. Ougdale, G. £• fix, III,*"257
G
Or-
11 ^ i am 11. to the Wi I helms tra s s e,ff Apr i1,10, 1898,tf 
. X 17 (Part 1), 217, no. 3790, Ga-in, flaatoslaliu Ill,
f-* p  TU* fi* 5 fkL* Garvin, .yyx
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Bekardstain contlnued to serve as a liaison between the 
Kaiser end the British Colonial Secretary, but he was no 
doubt unaware of the duplicity of the German foreign policy 
toward Bug!and. At the same time William was telling the 
Wilhelmstrass© to avoid an alliance with England, Eekard- 
stein, was Informing Chamberlain that William was not only 
elated at the prospect of an Anglo-German alliance, but that 
he also wished for the negotiations to he accelerated.^
On April Chamberlain conferred with Hatsfeldt; they 
again discussed the proposed Anglo-German alliance, and the 
German ambassador continued to throw up obstacles to the 
agreement. If the negotiations were to become public and 
then fail to bring an alliance, Hatsfeldt argued, the news 
of the German participation in th© discti.ssi.ons would per­
manently alienate Russia and Germany. If the treaty ver© a 
public document, the British Parliament could reject it, 
leaving Germany isolated. If it were a private arrangement, 
future British Governments could repudiate it. Bather than 
conclude a direct defensive alliance with Germany, Hatsfeldt 
suggested that Chamberlain strengthen British ties with the 
Triple Alliance through closer relations with Italy and 
Austria. To this Chamberlain was definitely cool; Germany 
was the key. If there could be an Anglo-Goraan alliance, 
Italy and Austria, of necessity, won'td participate, in 
closing, Chamberlain hinted that if Germany did not want an
13 Bckar&stein, .llr timer ungap. I, 29**-296. Garvin, Cham- 
iSElain, m *  270-271.
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*1alliance with England, he could secure support elsewhere*
The British Prime Minister was generally less enthusi­
astic about the idea of an alliance with Germany than was his 
Radical subordinate, but even he manifested favorable interest 
In the negotiations whan he returned to London* Chamber­
lain sent Salisbury a record of his proposals and conversa­
tions with Hatzf©l&t. The Prise Minister agreed that a 
"closer relation with. Germany would be very desirable,11 but, 
he then ashed, "can we get it?r,^ 5
On Hay 13? 1898, Chamberlain attempted to set the stage 
for a "closer relation with Germany" when he spoke out 
against the British policy of isolation in a speech at Bir­
mingham 5
Since the Crimean War * . . the policy of this 
country has been a policy of strict isolation*
We have had no allies. I am afraid we have had 
no Friends. * * . We are liable to be confronted 
any moment with a combination of Great Powers.
. • . We b tand alone.
The policy of isolation, insisted Chamberlain, would be
particularly disastrous for Great Britain in China; if
England could secure assistance from some other power, she
should follow that courses
We must not allow our Jingos to drive us into 
quarrel with all the world at the same time,
"Chamberlain1s Fourth Memorandum," April 25,
Garvin, ill? 273-275.
"Salisbury to Chamberlain," May 2, 1898, Ibid*, 279. 
16 J M m  282.
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and we must not reject the Idea of an alliance 
with those Powers whose Interests are most 
nearly approximate to onr own.~*v
The Birmingham speech apparently contradicted a Salisbury
address of Hay *+$ Sir William Earcourt, the former Chancellor
18of the Exchequer, referred to it as a ’’counter-manifesto.,f*
Although the Prime Minister did say that Chamberlain*s speech 
was not binding on the British Cabinet,^ and that it was not 
necessarily a policy statement, he refused to disavow his 
Colonial Secretary* It is probable that Salisbury knew the 
general tenor of his subordinate1s speech before it was deliv­
ered, even if fee did not have a cony of the text* In any 
case, the Prime Minister’s failure to disavow Chamberlain’s 
speech in nubile demonstrated that what Chamberlain said was 
essentially correct— Great Britain desired security through 
an alliance*
The world press criticised the belligerent note sounded 
by Chamberlain’s Birmingham speech, and even the House of 
Commons became the scene of stormy debate* Although the 
Colonial Secretary somewhat modified his views in later public 
statements, he still held that 'I £chamber1ain] am perfectly
n A
ready to say now that I desire better relations with Germany.*
" 7 Sarvia, Chaofccrlairu XIX, 2 8 2 . 
18 Lanier, 31aloaac.y Xsiaerlalias, xx, ?uo.- w .  TT,  SBW»i .r.-jfo fri '•*,
Friedrich Melneeke, QeacMcMft iia& fleutsgji-englischsn 
Bueqdalsgroblgffls. 1 B 9 0 - 1 9 Q 1  (menchen* n . _01dsnbourg, 1927),
20
P. 97. Hereaiter cited as "Iteineofce, BaonaniBPr.obXoms
Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy. p. 172.
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If the Birmingham speech was a public expression of a 
British desire for an Anglo--Gorman rapprochementy why did 
Germany fail to respond favorably? One of the reasons lies 
in the fact that since Chamberlain had expressed the British 
desire for Anglo-German friendship and conceded that Great 
Britain could no longer be self-sufficient* there was no 
longer any need for Germany to hurry Into an agreement. The 
Reich could continue to follow a policy similar to that which 
she had followed in the last months, and she could perhaps 
secure a more favorable agreement.
In early June Berlin received the news of the Anglo-
Portuguese negotiations over a possible loan to Portugal in
which Lisbon would use her African colonies as security. On
June 8 Buelov advised Katrfeldt to determine the view of the
British Government on the alienation of Portuguese colonial
rights or using their rights as a pledge for foreign capital.
England and Germany, as the most interested neighbors of
Portugal,, should cone to an understanding before such an
oiagreement could be reached.^
On June H a t e l d t * In a. conference with Lord Salis­
bury, protested against a unilateral British loan to Portugal 
which used the Portuguese African colonies as security. The 
Prime liinister declared that he did not know the conditions 
imposed on Portugal for such a loan and suggested that
21 "Buelov to Katzfeldt," June 8, 1898, 0. P. XIV 
(Part 1), 259-261, no. 3806.
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Hatzfel&t discuss the matter with Chamberlain, who was con­
ducting the negotiations*. Salisbury also told Hatzfeldt that 
he would inform him of any steps which the British Govern­
ment would take "which might concern the rights or legitimate
pp
interests of Germany in the Portuguese colonies*11 Salis-
bury reminded Hatzfeldt of earlier .Anglo-Portuguese treaties
by which England was bound 'co protect Portugal’s possessions!
because of these treaty obligations Great Britain sought to
prevent the disintegration of the Portuguese empire through
a generous loan* Hatzfeldt, however, maintained that a
pledge of Portugal1s sovereign rights In her colonies to
Great Britain woul unfavorable impression with Gor-
23many*
Hatzfeldt, in requesting authority to discuss possible 
German participation in the proposed loan to Portugal, sug­
gested that Germany receive Angola as security while reeog- 
nlslhg British Interests in .Da lag os. Bay* Buelow, however, 
maintained that Germany would also have to receive the Por­
tuguese territory north of the Zambezi, because the pledge 
of Delsgo® Bay would deeply affect German public opinion* An
^  "Salisbury to Gough," June 1H-, 189-8, B. J>*, 1, **8, 
no. 3 0 0 6.
^3 "Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office,n June l*fs I89S,
G* XIV (Part 1), 261-262, no* 3807. Raymond Walter Bix-
(Yorkt Pennsylvania* Maple stress Gompanyy±932), pp. XIM—11p
Hereafter cited as Bixler, Aigglp-GeriBuri laasEialisau
^Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office," June 15, IB98,
G* P. XIY (Part 1), 263-26b-, no. 3808* Bixler, An.elo-
&gBaaa ImssXaUas* ?• 115.
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additional pled go of territory would help an'-uage the Icss.^ 
In order to exert additional, pressure for a widening of 
participation in the proposed loan, Germany and France brought 
up the matter in Lisbon. Hanotaux, the French .Foreign Minis­
ter, was apparently unaware of the German desire to partici­
pate in the Loan with England. He called for an energetic 
resistance to the Anglo*Portuguese loan.^6 Count von Tatten- 
bach, the German Minister in Lisbon, received instructions to 
launch a protest of the loan with the Portuguese king; since 
economic considerations involved political factors, he argued, 
the proposed loan could not be merely a bilateral arrangement. 2?
On June 20 Buelow received the Information that Alfred
von Rothschild thought the agreement over the proposed loan
was closed. The Foreign Minister then told Hatsfeldt that
Germany was willing to roach an understanding by sharing the
20spheres of interest with Great Britain.
The next day Salisbury Informed Ratnfeldt that the Cabinet 
had decided that any financial arrangement with Portugal 
concerned only that country and England. Great Britain would 
attempt to maintain the status quo in the Portuguese colonies,
2 5 "Buelow to Hatzfeldt," June 17, 1898, g. P., XIV (Part 1)
Sob, no. 3809. Bixlor, Anglo-Garraaq Hauer ialIsm.~*o■ 115.
26 "Muenster to the Foreign Office," June 19, 1898,
G. P., XIV (Part 1), 268, no. 38W .
2? "Buelow to Tattenbach," June 18, I898, Q. P., XIV 
(Port 1), 265-266, no. 3811. “
28 "Buelow to Hatzfeldt," Juno 20, 1398, G. P., XIT (Part 1)
269, no. 3816, Bixler, Angla-aexsan Irongrlkllanu 117.
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but if this were not possible, she would come to an agreement 
with Germany over the areas in which the latter had interests*^ 
Hatzfeldt, however, said the financial question was related to 
the colonial question! if the African colonies were used as 
security, an agreement was necessary* Salisbury felt the 
German demands for .Angola and northern Mozambique were exces­
sive, but at the end of their meeting he did assure Hatzfeldt 
that he would not conclude the loan to Portugal before at­
tempting to settle the territorial question*^
On June 22, Several, the Portuguese minister, informed 
Salisbury that the Kaisar had commanded the Portuguese king 
to receive the German minister! at the ensuing meeting T&tten- 
bach attempted to forestall the Anglo-Portuguesc loan through 
diplomatic pressure* Germany and Portugal could not continue 
on friendly terms, the German minister declared, if Anglo- 
Portuguese negotiations were carried on without regard for 
German interests in the area* Buelow made similar protests 
to the Portuguese Minister in Berlin, and the French minister 
at Lisbon also voiced his government* s objection to the pro­
posed loan.^
Ihe Gorman actions had placed Great Britain in a most 
** Salisbury to Gough,” June 21, 1898, 2* £., I,
no. 6?.
^  ^Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office,** June 21, 1898, G> P. 
XIV (Part 1), 270-271, no. 3317. Bixler, MElorOsmmn Mtmzl- 
altsrru p. 118-119.
31 “Salisbury to MacDonsll," June 22, 1898, B, D., I,
50, no* 68.
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difficult situation* Under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese 
loan which the two countries had agreed upon, Great Britain 
would assume control of Delagoa Bay, the only non-British 
entrance into the Transvaal, and t^ ouid also assume a voice in 
the management of the railway* Because of the Boer arms 
build-up such assurances were necessary* Should hostilities 
commence it m s  assumed that England could defeat the Boers, 
but if Germany decided to protect her interests it was pos­
sible that Great Britain would face a continental alliance.*. 
France voluntarily eliminated herself from the discussions 
when Belcasse', who replaced Hanotaux at the Foreign Office, 
allowed the matter to drop, but Germany still voiced vigorous 
opposition to a bilateral Anglo-Portuguese loan..^2, It would 
be better to secure an agreement with Germany, perhaps a 
pledge to give up all ties in the fransvaal, than to conclude 
a loan to Portugal without Germany. England still could 
isolate the Boers, but with German approval.
Salisbury lamely told Several that Germany had .no right 
to intervene in a purely financial arrangement, because the 
pledge of colonies as security was not an alienation of ter­
ritory, but he did not assure the Portuguese minister that
IBthere would be no Anglo-German agreement*"
32 Longer, D^omaey ImexAaliLaB. It, 533, Holstein 
Paaers, r, 113-114-.
33 "Salisbury to Msic'Donell," Juno 22, 1398, jj. 3., T,
50, no. 68.
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In a dispatch of Jane 22* Buelow further emphasized his 
demand in favor of German participation in the loan to Por­
tugal. If England were to extend the loan and seise additional 
territory in Africa without consulting Germany
damage is involved not only to German interests* 
hut also to the prestige of the Government of His 
Majesty . . . .  and against this Germany would be 
forced to react with energy. Therefore England 
will certainly get cheaper out of this by first 
agreeing with Germany^ egarding her schemes for 
expansion in Africa.-^
On. June .22 Chamberlain sent a telegram to Sir Alfred 
Milner, asking him to ascertain the reaction of the Cape 
Colony to a cession of Waiflseh Bay to Germany in exchange 
for ^commercial control in time of peace and right of oc­
cupation in time of war of Delagoa Bay and railway.*1^  The 
Colonial Secretary wanted to offer the Bay to Germany* if 
Germany would offer her services as an honest broker” in 
inducing Portugal to give England, control of Delagoa Bay.
Chamberlain received Milner*s reply the next day* but 
it was hardly encouraging, toy agreement Involving the ces­
sion of ilalfisch Bay would adversely affect South African 
public opinion. Both the Cape Colony and Katal, however, 
would welcome an increased Interest In Delagoa Bay and the
Cl •»
railway.*"'
3** "Buslovr to "atzfeldt,” Juno 22, 1393, 3. P., I W  
(Part 1), 272, no. 3313, Dusdale, 2. J2- 2*> 07, 33-3?.
'’Chamberlain to Milner," -Tune 22, 1898, Kesdilam, 
Milner Papers. I, 266. Lang or, ainloraagy o£ Imperialtscu
TT COO y -O •
"Milner_to Charaborlain," Juno 23, 1398, Headlam,
gasscs, v, 267.
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On. June 23 Hatzfeldt proposed that German and Great 
Britain make parallel loans to Portugal* although the amount 
which each country contributed did not necessarily have to 
be the same* He also suggested that Great Britain and 
Germany agree on the customs revenue which each country should 
have as security for their loan. Gar many would give England 
the territory in Mozambique south of the Sambezi* while Ger­
many would receive the land north of the Sambozi in addition 
to the colony of Angola. The two nations could only take the 
territory If Portugal could not meet her obligations. Salis­
bury said the Germany demands wore too largo* it was Impos- 
sibls to roach an agreement on these t e r m s . L a t e r  In the 
conversation Hatzfeldt hinted that Germany was not the only 
power interested in the Anglo-Perfugues© negotiations. Prance 
was also Interested in Delagoa Bay because of her colony in 
Madagascar. It would be better* therefore* to divide the
colonies only two ways rather than Include France In the 
28negotiations.
At the same tine Berlin received welcome news from the 
German ambassador in St. Petersburg. He said that Pussia 
would not Join France In opposing an Anglo-German agreement 
over the Portuguese colonies since Russia had no colonies 
in Africa. This seemed to avert any possible general
i 0 »» i
"Salisbury to Sough," .Tune 23, 1393, g. T, Mp- 
53, no. 70.
•U Ibid.. d. 53. "Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office,"
June 2b,1398, G. P., XIV (Part 1), 277, no. 3819. Bixler, 
i££l2.”&£ESa& Impe.rla.lisn. p. 120.
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EuroDean clash over the agreement, should France object*
Great Britain and Portugal continued their discussions
for a loan during the Anglo-German conferences* At the end 
of dune Portugal still sought a sum of 48*000,000* One fourth 
of this amount, to be used for improvements at Lorenzo Marques 
and Belagoa Bay, was to be secured on the customs of Mozam­
bique* The rest of the loan would be used to pay the Portu­
guese floating debt, and the customs of Portugal herself would 
secure this part of the loan* Salisbury hinted that the ad­
vantages to England would not be very great* but Several 
pointed out that Great Britain would control'Delagoa Bay and 
the railway*. The Portuguese ambassador also desired that the 
arrangements should be made so as to not offend Prance or 
Germany*
Count von Tattenbaeh, the Oarman envoy to Lisbon, in­
formed the German Foreign Office, on June 30, that the Por­
tuguese king had promised to conduct no negotiations for a 
loan which included territorial guarantees without first in­
forming the German Government* Germany would also share in
?, -j
such a loan. With these assurances Germany was able to con­
duct her negotiations with England over the Portuguese loan 
with renewed vigor*
39 **Tsciiirschkey to the Foreign Office,June 23? IB9B,
o. -o. ttv (p-x*t 1), 280, no# 3820. Bixler, Anglo-German
^Salisbury to Mae Done 1 1 , June 29? 1898, B* £., I, 53*
£•
p * 121
XVT (Part 1;, 281* no. 3*521. .Dugdaie, &• u. d* j xiij 3
ei
Despite the apparent acceptance of Germany in the nego­
tiation, some in the British bureaucracy still questioned the 
advisability of an. agreement with Germany. Sir Francis Bertie, 
one of the undersecretaries in the British Foreign Office, 
warned against the possible consequences of German participa­
tion in the loan. If Germany should take part in the negoti­
ations, Dolagoa Bay might become an international matter. 
Besides, he argued, mere proximity to Portuguese colonies in 
Africa did not give Germany the right to participate in the 
negotiations. Did not France also border on the Portuguese
IlO
colonies?
Salisbury and Chamberlain both saw the value of an 
understanding with Germany, but neither appreciated the pres­
sure which that country placed on Lisbon. The Colonial 
Secretary urged Portugal to resist the encroachments of Ber­
lin and Paris Into her private business* He wanted Britain 
and Portugal first to males their arrangements because he was 
nafraid that If the present opportunity [to conclude the loanQ 
is allowed to pass It may never recur. Apparently the 
Colonial Secretary wanted to make one further effort to con­
clude an agreement with Portugal before the Anglo-German 
negotiations progressed any further.
^2 HKemorandnri by Its. Bertie,n June 3D, 1898, £. D., I, 
no. 72. The French Congo bordered on Kabinda, a Por­
tuguese possession north of the Congo* The Congo Free State 
also had a border common with Angola*
if3 Chamber lain to Several,11 July h7 1398, Garvin,
‘ ' III, 312.
On July 6 Salisbury and Hatzfeldt again conferred over 
the question of the loan to Portugal. The Prime Minister in­
dicated that fee was willing to come to an agreement* he had 
several proposals. He asked Hatzfeldt whether Germany would 
give up her extra-territoriality in Zanzibar. He also felt 
that the situation in the Iberian Peninsula was too unclear
M | ,
to permit the two powers to pursue a definite plan. The 
United States had Just defeated the Spanish fleet at Santiago, 
and the Portuguese were becoming more sensitive to foreign 
Interference In their colonial possessions. At the same time 
Great Britain received added impetus for settling the question 
of Delagoa Bay.
On July 6 Sir Alfred Milner oreseated his general views 
of South Africa to the Colonial Secretary* Be felt the situ­
ation with the Transvaal in South Africa was becoming quite 
serious and doubted if r,we [the British] shall ever be mas­
ters without a war• *' If Great Britain could secure Delagoa 
Bay in exchange for Walfisch Bay, he felt that most people 
fVit!i reasonable open mindsn would agree. Failure to gain 
Delagoa Boy could be disastrous to the British interests in
'•VVC 4*Vy /■* Y* vs f' *1 —* *
W* • •*" trV 1tfr + At -i <*«iw U* 49
The possession of Delayoa Bay is the best chance 
we [.the Britlslf) have of winning the great game 
between ourselves and the Transvaal for the mas­
tery In South Africa without a war. . . .  The 
overwhelming preponderance in wealth and oppor-
**** ftHatsfslcit to the Foreign Office,!* July 6, 1893. £. P., 
HIT (Part 1), 201, no. 3023. Dugdale, G. ,0. rj., ill, 35.
Bixler, IimlsllSB? P* 121.
tunity on the side of the Transvaal may turn the 
scale against us* unless ve have cone means to 
bring very effective pressure to bear upon that 
country*
This ominous warning vac further proof for those in the British 
Foreign and Colonial Offices who" wanted a quick agreement.
Hatzfeldt* on July 9* urged an immediate understanding 
between Germany and Ingland. Trance* according to the German 
ambassador* was spreading rumors that Portugal had already 
concluded an agreement with Gangland over the coastal ter­
ritories. This* because of the.influence on Portuguese 
public opinion* could permanently disrupt negotiations for the 
loan. Hatzfeldt wanted both Germany and England to partici­
pate in the loan; if the Portuguese were unable to continue 
In possession of their colonies* the customs duties which 
each country managed would indicate that country’s tentative
k6
claims to the Portuguese possessions.
As a result of his conversation with Hatzfeldt * the
Prime 'Minister came to the opinion that William wanted an
agreement with England* but he fH?as taking the opportunity to
ky
make larger demands than he was prepared to press*" ' They 
had stated that Germany wanted Great Britain to give up 
Angola and her rights along the Shire Fiver. If Britain 
refused the latter* Germany would accept the British part of
E l in o r  to  C hsuabsrla in,u J u ly  V  1398, Headlaai, 
iiti&SE 2fia££fi., 1, 267-268.
Lh6 11 Galls;bury to Gon-h," July 9, 1398, B. B., 1, 55, 
no. 7k.
8*f
the Samoan and Tonga islands. In addition to this* Hatzfeldt 
called for the Portuguese half of Timor in the East Indies. 
Salisbury said the British public would never allow the ces­
sion of any territory along the Shire River* since missionaries 
had first explored and developed the region. The British Prime 
Minister agreed to consider the request for Portuguese Timor* 
although he privately -confessed that he did not know why Oar- 
many was interested in the area. Salisbury made a. counter­
proposal in which he said he would be willing to give up 
Walfisch Bay to Germany* JX Germany would cede the whole of 
Togoland to Great Britain***9 He knew Hatzfeldt would not 
accept this proposal.
On July 13 Salisbury and Hatzfeldt again discussed the 
proposed loan to Portugal. The British Prime Minister sug­
gested that Great Britain receive Portuguese Mozambique south 
of the Zambezi* Including Delagoa Bay and the railway* and the 
province of Angola north of the town of Bglto* as security 
for a loan* Germany would receive the northern cart of Mozam­
bique and Portuguese Angola south of Bgito. While both powers 
sought to maintain the integrity of the Portuguese colonial 
empire* if Portugal would disease of her colonies* the powers 
making the loans would have a. pre-emptive right In the areas 
where they secured the interest on the customs houses.^
Garvin, Chamberlain, III, 31!-k  'Hatzfeldt to the 
Fore is® Office, Tuly'tf, 1393, G. P., XIV (Part 1), 238-289,
no. 3827.
Garvin, loc. clt.
V  ‘'Salisbury to Gough," July 13, 1898, B. 0., I, 56-57,
no* 7 5 * ^Katzfeldt to Foreign O f f i c e J u l y  XJ* lB$8 y G. P.* 
(Part 1)* 293-29*+1 no* 3331* BlxXer* A&gIo-German Imperialism* 
pp. 123-12**.
On the same day that Salisbury announced his proposals
to the German ambassador, the Portuguese minister announced
that his country had decided in favor of the status quo and
against any idea of a loan from Great Britain or any other
government* This also would include any change of states
51in the Portuguese African colonies* Portugal would at-
5?tempt to secure sufficient funds on her home revenues*
Salisbury informed Several that Britain would strongly op­
pose any proposal for international control which any of the 
major powers might make* ^ Should Delagoa Bay fall into the 
hands of an unfriendly power, the Transvaal could continue to 
secure additional supplies and armaments for use against 
Great Britain*
Lord Salisbury blamed the influence of France in Por­
tugal for the failure of the proposed loan. Hatzfeldt even 
thought the French action could lead to an internationaliza­
tion of Delagoa Bay.^4* The Prime Minister, of course, wanted 
to avoid this at all costs* Salisbury and Hatzfeldt contin­
ued their discussions over the proposed loan, despite the Por­
tuguese decision, because neither felt that Portugal could be­
come financially stable without assistance from abroad*
^  ^Salisbury to MaeBonell,!t July 13, 1893, B. D., I,
57, no. 76*
^  ^Chamberlain1 s Memorandum of Bis Interview with Several, 
July 15, 1898, Garvin, Chamberlain, III, 313*
53 Bixier, ti££l2-2ssaaa isa§£iali3&» ?• 12*+.
^  M »  p. 125.
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The British Cabinet agreed to the German demand for Por­
tuguese Timor, but it refused to consider the German request 
for Samoa or Tonga because of the opposition of Australia* 
Germany would have to make large concessions, such as Togo- 
land, in order to receive Half!seh Bay* The Gorman ambas­
sador expressed his regret at the British demands, and he 
said he felt the negotiations might come to an end* Hatzfeldt 
again threatened to turn to Russia because, In Salisbury1 s  
words, 5<in the position occupied by Germany, she f GermanyJ 
could not stand alone#112? Hatzfeldt had often repeated this 
threat during the course of his conversations with Salisbury, 
but the Prime Minister did not take it seriously*
Although Hatzfeldt expressed his disappointment over the 
negotiations and suggested that Germany might turn elsewhere, 
Germany wanted a quick conclusion of the agreement over the 
Portuguese loon* The Empress Frederick, in a letter to her 
mother, stated that Chamberlain1s statements had made a 
favorable impression on the .Kaiser and that he urgently desired 
an agreement with E n gland.Great Britain also wanted to 
continue the negotiations, and the British ambassador in 
Berlin told Baron von Richthofen, a Foreign Office official, 
that he thought England would concede more than it seemed at 
that time and that it was still possible that Germany would
55 "Salisbury to GoujrU,» July 20, 1398, B. D., I, 58-59,
no. 78.
8?
receive Walfiscli Bay* 5ia.noa, and northern Angola*^
On July 27 Hatzfeldt renewed the discussions over the
proposed loan to Portugal and the spheres of influence each
country would receive if the loan were made* The German am**
offered Britain the customs receipts of Mozambique
south 03? the Zambesi} including Delagoa Bay and the railway*
and the portion of Angola between the 12th parallel (Egito)
and the 7th parallel (Leiundo River)* Germany would administer
the part of Mozambique north of the Zambesi and the remaining
portions of Angola* (See Map III* p* 88}* Hatsfeldt did not
mention Samoa or Portuguese Timor nor did Salisbury bring up
the question of extra-territoriality of Zanzibar at this
meeting. The German ambassador felt that an equal loan by
both Germany and Great Britain would not be suitable* sines
g0
the major Portuguese harbors were in the British spheres*
The .Prime Minister said he did not third: it vis© for Germany 
to secure the Portuguese territory north of the Zambezi and 
west of the Shire5 if Germany would receive this* she would 
almost surround the British settlements along the Shire*^ 
Hatzfeldt repeated the desire for maintaining the territorial 
integrity of Portugal but requested that the two powers bind 
themselves together not to recognize any alienation of ter­
ritory to "any power except to the one to whom the revenues
V"Richthofen to Eulenburg, July 2*f, IS9S, £. XIV 
(Part 1), 333» no. 3839. Bixler, .Anglo-German Imperialism, p. 126.
58 Bixler, loc. cit.. p. 121.
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were assigned#11
In the next conference between Salisbury and Hatzfeldt 
over the loan to Portugal, the Gorman ambassador sought ad­
ditional compensation for having been deprived of the region 
north of the Zambezi and vest of the Shire. Vlhen Salisbury 
suggested that Germany extend her claim in Portuguese Angola, 
Hatzfeldt proposed that the northern boundary between the 
British and German spheres of influence be moved south from 
the 7th to the 8th parallel# This would adequately compen­
sate Germany for any loss in Mozambique* Salisbury also sug­
gested that Britain be assigned warehouse space at the mouth 
of the Congo Elver, since Germany would control this sphere* 
Hatzfeldt offered several minor suggestions which Salisbury 
approved, "subject to the condition that they were accepted 
by Portugal."62
Hatzfeldt reported on August 8 that Salisbury did not 
want to seem in Lisbon as an "expectant heir," dividing her 
property before she desired to part with it* As a result 
Salisbury declared that he wanted only to make public the 
loan to Portugal; the two powers would place all points 
regarding the transfer of colonies in a secret agreement* 
Hatzfeldt agreed and suggested that if the proposed trans­
fer of colonies were made known, IGrance might cite the Anglo-
"Salisbury to Lascellos," July 27, 1898, D. D., X,
599 no* 79.
"Salisbury to Lascolles," August 3, 1898, B* 0* > 
60, no* 80*
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German agreement an a precedent and conclude a similar agree­
ment with Spain.^ Hatnfeldt objected to Salisbury*s an­
nouncement that he was going on leave and that Balfour would 
continue the negotiations! the participants would lose too 
much time because of the change. He did feel, however, that
Balfour had been !lionest and forthcoming11 during the previous
Gk-time he represented Salisbury* ■
On August 10 Sir Francis Bertie submitted another memo­
randum to the Foreign Office in which he questioned the value 
of an agreement with Germany* England, argued Bertie, already 
had rights in Delagoa Bay by a previous agreement with Por­
tugal and would gain little under the terms of the proposed 
agreement* Several had strongly opposed the agreement, and 
there was doubt whether Portugal would accept a loan which 
included Anglo-German co-operation. Bertie pointed out that 
Germany was "not likely to risk a quarrel or even an estrange­
ment with Bussla for our [^British] benefit unless we guarantee 
her against France and Russia*1* If Germany thought more of 
taking possession of her security than maintaining the Por­
tuguese empire, this might "raise a question of our ^England*sj 
treaty obligations and cause the quarrel which we are seeking 
to avoid, f|6?
^3 "Hat&feldt to the Foreign Off ice," August 8, 1898, 
G. XI? (Part 1), 3X6* no. 381*8, DugdaXe, g. £. , III,
316. Bixler, Ang 1 o-Gar man Imperialism. p* 127-
a* £*» loc. cit.. Dugdale, G. £. ioc. clt.
^  "Memorandum by Mr. Bertie,'1 August 10, 1898, B. I)., 
x, 60*“6i, no.
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Salisbury also expressed some apprehension over German
designs in South Africa, although he still desired to reach
an ug reament* In a let uar to vue ■yuo an, t h q I' x' Ime i ■i jl n i. & x> e r
declared that the British Government is
vary anxious to make it clear that we desire to 
keep the Portuguese monarchy upright; and to pro­
tect her in the possession of her colonies, so 
long as there is no revolution at Lisbon, and the 
monarchy remains standing. Germany professes the 
same desire* but we are not quite so sure of her 
sincerity*55
During their conference of August 11, Hatzfeldt and 
Balfour assured each other of the desire of their govern­
ments to maintain the Portuguese colonial empire* They dis­
cussed once again the limits of their respective interests 
In Angola. At the end of the conversation Hatzfeldt left 
his unofficial suggestions for a treaty between the two 
countries. Great Britain and Germany would provide either a 
common loan or parallel loans to Portugal on the customs of 
Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Timor. The governments 
were to pledge £8,000,000, but the suggestions did not state 
the amount of each government1 s share* England would re­
ceive the customs of Mozambique south of the Sambezi and a 
central portion of Angola, while Germany would receive northern 
Mozambique, the rest of .Angola., and Portuguese Timor
On August 12 Richthofen urged Hatzfeldt to lose no time
^  “Salisbury to Queen Victoria,“ August 10, 1898, 0. T. L«, 
3rd series, III, 263-26 .^
“Memorandum, Communicated Unofficially by Hatzfeldt,11 
August 11, 1898, J|* J2>, I, 62-63, Enclosure in no. 82*
in the negotiations. He informed the ambassador that France 
had rejected a Portuguese attempt to secure a loan because 
of insufficient guarantees; this was an indication, according 
to Richthofen, that France also sought territorial guarantees• 
Nfhere can be no doubt as to the urgent character of the Por­
tuguese need of money, f'f he declared, tfthe only question is 
whether 'France or England and Germany give it.
On August 18 Balfour, in two unofficial declarations, out­
lined his plan for the final settlement of the proposed loan. 
Great Britain would provide two-thirds of the loan and Ger­
many one-third. The former would receive southern Mozambique 
and the Blantyre region along the Shire Biver. In Angola. 
Britain would receive the area
north of Egito to the line passing from Imbriz to 
the intersection of the 8th parallel of south 
latitude with the l6tb degree of longitude east 
of Greenwich thence descending that degree to the 
9th parallel of latitude and following that paral­
lel eastward as far as the Congo Free State. y
Germany was assigned the rest of Mozambique and the ter­
ritory south of Bgito and north of the line running from 
Amferiz.^ The two countries would also oppose the entrance 
of a third power
either by way of loan to Portugal on the security 
of the revenues of those provinces, or by way of 
acquisition of territory, by grant, cession, pur-
Richthofen to Hatzfeldt,ft August 12, 1898, G. P.,
XI? (Part 1), 317, no. 3850. Dugdal©, &*. £* 2., 37.
69 Unofficial Draft Declarations, Balfour to Hat 2- 
feldt,,T August 18, 1898, 2* D*, I, 6h~65, Enclosure X in no. 83
70 2 UL&.
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71chase, lease or otherwise*
Richthofen, In commenting on Balfour*s statement, declared
that rtan arrangement without Timor is unacceptable to us.”
wIn our eyas,*'1 declared Richthofen, ”the agreement over Per-
72tugal was the starting point of a joint colonial policy.”
The Marquis da Several conversed with Balfour on August 
19 over the possible participation of Germany in the For* 
tu.guese loan. He thought that Portugal would negotiate the 
loan with Great Britain, who in turn would make an arrange­
ment with Germany. Balfour, however, said it would he in 
the interacts of everyone to include Germany in the loan. It 
would he ^inexpedient” to borrow solely from Great Britain; 
that country would also frown on Portugal^ borrowing from 
other powers because of the danger of international controls; 
the only other possible alternative would be a parallel loan 
from Great Britain and Germany. Several intimated that he 
thought the arrangement was all right, and Balfour promised 
to contact the Portuguese minister If he concluded a final
nr *5
agreement with Germany.Balfour did not, however, tell 
Several about the customs agreements.
By August 20 the German ambassador In London was able 
to say that the question of Timor was settled; he gave full 
credit for the Inclusion of Timor, in the German sphere of
^Unofficial Draft Declarations, Balfour to Hatzfeldt,11 
August 18, I898, J3. D., I, 6W>5, Enclosure 2 in no. 83.
xrsr
"Balfour
73 Balfour to Thornton,” .August 18, 1893, g. JJ., I, 66,
no. c
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influence to Balfour, who * * v a * g @ ntly*' desired a conclusion of
7k
the nso o t i a t i ons•
On August 22 .Balfour and Hatzfeldt discussed one of the 
last major problems which separated them from a final agree­
ment. Sine© Great Britain already held pre-emptive rights at 
Beingoa Bay,, it was possible that she could acquire special 
privileges there, Batsfoldt declared that German public opin­
ion would be aroused if Great Britain would gain advantages 
in her area and Germany would not make similar gains. He pro­
posed that Great Britain could not gain any advantage in 
Delagoa Bay ^unless and until Germany acquired similar advan­
tages in the region to which she was prepared, under the agree­
ments, to confine her interests*Balfour suggested that
if either country obtained and exorcised privi­
leges not contemplated by the Agreements, it 
should abstain from objecting to the other 
country obtaining and exorcising similar privi­
leges, it being of course understood that the 
privileges were in every case to be confined to 
the regions in which the two Powers were respec­
tively^ interested under the terms of the Agree­
ment . ^
On August 2b Buolow and the Emperor agreed to the pro-
ffHatsfeldt to the Foreign Office,n August 20, 1893, 
P., XXV (Part 1), 328, no. 3860. Dugdale, £. D. D., III, 
38* In a typical Wilhelmian letter, the Kaiser wrote that un­
less the negotiations led to a more satisfactory result, nth.e 
continued presence of my Ambassador in London would be super­
fluous just now.” Dugdale G. B. D., III, 38. See -also HLas- 
celles to Balfour,*1 August 22, lcl9o, B. £• 5 1,68-69, no. 87.




posal to join Britain in opposing the intervention of a
rjry
third roarer In South Africa.., but Holstein warned that the
agreement should only apply to matters in South .v -j. r s. e a • H
Germany supported England against Russia in the Far East,
Russia would aid France in South Africa in an attempt to
78secure territory from Germany and England. Balfour also
saw the Anglo-German agreement as a local alliance in a
letter to the Queent
He [BalfourJ hopes that an arrangement may be come 
to, not disadvantageous to Portugal, which will ce­
ment the friendship between the country and the 
German Empire, and will indeed amount to a positive 
alliance so far as South Africa is concerned*79
By August 28 the two negotiators had agreed on all
ports of the treaty, and they submitted copies to their
Governments for approval* A last mi mite effort by Sir
Francis Bertie to change the border in Angola which gave
gO
Bgito to Germany failed, and the two powers signed the 
convention, a secret convention, and a note (see Appendix 
A, p* 117) on August 30, 1898*
77 *«Buelow to the Emperor,” August 2hf 1898, G. 2*, XVI 
(Part 1), 3^0, no* 3S67. hug&ale, fi. 2* 2* > -^9 3«-39.
7^ “Memorandum by Holstein,n August 26, 1898, G. £*,
XIV (Part 1), 3 ^ 2 - no. 3867* Bixler, Aiklo-ilermaii 
allam* pp. 132-133* tfDie englische Panserflotte koenne nlcht 
ein Dorf an der langgestrackten deutschen Qstgrenze schuetsen,11 
declared the Kaiser on August 21, Meinecke, Buandnisorobiem* 
p. 105*
79 «Balfour to Queen Victoria,rf August 26, 1898, 0* V. L., 
3rd series, III, 266.
rtHatzf©ldt to the Foreign Office,H August 28, 1898,
G. P., XIV (Part 1), p. 3lf5-3'f6, no. 3870* Bixler, AneXo-
P- 133.
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The Convention between Germany and England provided 
that the two governments would simultaneously Issue loans to 
Portugal on favorable terns on the security of the customs 
revenue of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor* Britain 
would be assigned the customs revenues of Mozambique south 
of the Zambezi and the part of that province north and west 
of the conflux of the Zambezi and the shire5 in addition to 
this she would receive the central portion of .Angola (see 
Map r/, p. 97)* Germany would receive the customs of the 
remaining portions of Mozambique and Angola, plus Portu­
guese Timor* The delegates sent Into the customs area by 
each country would only have the right of collection, not 
of administration, unless ther q w a s a default on the payment 
of Interest*
The secret convention suggested that it may prove Im­
possible to maintain the Portuguese colonies* The two powers 
also agreed to oppose jointly a third power If it attempted 
to lend money on the security of the Portuguese colonies*
The secret note provided that If one of the partici­
pating parties should receive a special concession from Por­
tugal, the act would. nnot become operative until analogous 
grants as near as possible of ecu&l value have been accorded 
to the other Government*1
As the representatives of Germany and Great Britain 
signed the Conventions of August 30, they assured each other 
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ink had not long boon, dry on the documents when it became 
apparent that unforeseen developments might endanger the 
realisation of the agreements, and Germany saw the possibil­
ity that she may have given up too much in order to "maintain 
the Portuguese Empire."
Daring the course of the negotiations leading tip to the 
settlement of August 3$, there was a question of whether to 
inform Portugal of the final settlement. Salisbury had dis­
cussed the possible Anglo-German collaboration over the loan 
with Several, but he had not informed th© Portuguese ambas­
sador of any territorial guarantees. .After the two countries 
signed the agreement, both Germany and Great Britain agreed to 
inform Portugal of the .Convention, but they decided to refrain 
from revealing the secret Convention. Balfour assured Several 
that the Convention which Germany and England signed “was 
quite as much for the interests of Portugal as for those of 
the other Powers concerned.
On August 30, despite the secrecy of the agreement, news­
papers in both Germany and England began to carry stories 
that the two countries had concluded important arrangements 
which would drastically alter their relationship with each 
other. The Pall Mall Gazette began a series of articles on 
the suspected agreement which extended to 11 an offensive and
p
defensive alliance In certain eventualities German news-
 ^ irBaXfour to Several, ’* August 31, IB98, 13. JJ., I, 75, 
no. 93.
2 Hale, lhib.JXci.tv and Mplemacv. p. 176. Hue low thought
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papers joined the discussion with arguments ranging from in­
formation that the two countries had signed an alliance to 
a complete refutation of any change of policy* The Koeln- 
fsqhq get turn? dented that Germany had changed her objectives* 
but that did not eliminate possible agreement on a specific 
question, such as *a joint loan to Portugal whose needy
3financial condition may sooner or To,tor require such action*1 
The general picture of the Anglo-German Convention gradu­
ally was pieced together from various sources. ^Dlplomaticus,** 
who was perhaps Lncien Wolf, presented the basic outline of 
the agreement in an article in the October issue of The Port- 
nightly Ea?lew. "Most people are satisfied," he declared,
"that, in some way or another* the agreement Is concerned 
with a transference of Delagoa, Bay to England,** but the agree­
ment covered a such wider scopes
The new Anglo-German Agreement is, in fact, an 
arrangement, resulting fro® certain negotiations 
with Portugal, by which the two great Powers 
divide between them a right of pre-emption in re­
gard to all the Portuguese colonies in Africa* It 
defines the territorial spheres of each of the two 
contracting Powers in those colonies, provides for 
the consideration to be paid as and when the colo­
nies are alienated by Portugal * * *^
-he Berliner Tpgehlatt also printed a reasonably accurate
summary of the Convention which its Lisbon correspondent had
England had released news of the agree®ont to the press* Bee• 
TtBuelow to Katsfeldt,*1 September 3, 1898, G* £♦, XIV (Part 1), 
359, no* 3876* Dug dale, G. 2* IVI, 39-*$*
3 Hale, and Diplomacy* p. 1?6.
k
H Diplomatlens,rf !tTh© Anglo-German Agreement , JJ TJ.ie Fort- 
nightly Be.vlQM I3CI7 (October 1898), 627, 629.
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received from Portuguese authorities. Ho one* however* dis­
covered the extent of each country*s share of Portugalfs 
colom.es*
Some German newspapers accepted the agreement as a sign 
of improved Ang1o-Gorman relations* while others strongly 
condemned it because It had given complete control of South 
.Africa to Britain, Despite the feeling in official circles 
that Germany had received adequate compensation* organ.'sat Ions 
such as the Pan-German 'League and the Colonial Society issued 
protests against the ,?fbetrayal of III,ed,er&eu t s c h torn.”u
The German Government defended Its position in a series 
of unofficial telegrams which appeared anonymously in a num­
ber of German newspapers. Since Great Britain already had an 
option on Delagoa Bay* Germany could not have orevented her 
from securing the valuable port, liith the agreement Germany 
would receive valuable compensation In the Portuguese colonies| 
without the agreement Germany would hove received nothing* As
for the question of abandoning the Boers* the Government pointed
7out that Germany had to provide for her com welfare.
The proceedng statement is norhaos the best argument which
hxbl.lc.ity and Diplomacy. p. 177* Sir Edvard 
Grey declared that the harquis do Several was even acquainted 
with the Secret Agreement* ** lie Several had toown all about 
the negotiations and the signature of the 1 Secret* Agreement* 
and had made no secret to Lord Salisbury of his knowledge of 
It,” Tlscomrt Grey* fweptv-fivc Years, 1893-19.16 0!ev Yorks 
Yredoriclc A* Stakes Company* 192^, W *
^ Halo, lee. cit.* pp, 177-178.
7 a,ij„  p. 179.
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can be advanced in favor of German participation in the pro­
posed loan to Portugal in 1898* Germany had strongly sup­
ported Kruger in 1896$ Germany abandoned Kruger in 1898* This 
Vets a definite break in German policy* While most of the mem- 
bars of the German Government would not have sent such an in­
flammatory dossago after the capture of Jameson, all had recog­
nised the value of the South African Republic to German as­
pirations# Heavy German interests in banking, industry, and 
mining necessitated strong official interest. The Kruger 
Government invested large sums in light and heavy armaments, 
and it seemed that the demand would continue * German had sup­
plied almost all the weapons which the Boers used; France was 
a poor second* It therefore seams strange that Buelw would 
have abandoned the Boers in 1898 by completely renouncing all 
interests in southern Africa. The head of the Foreign Of­
fice, in discussing his actions preceding the outbreak of the 
Boer War, declared in his memoirs %
I was determined from the first to keep us clear 
of any steps for the Boers and against1 the British.
I felt the more justified in this in that for 
months' past, ♦ # * I * * . had ©specially urged 
President Kruger, to go cautiously and eon©iliator- 
ily to work, and had left not the slightest room for 
any doubt in the minds of the loers that . . * they 
must not count on receiving any help from us.
Thera was, however, a deep underlying motive In back of Ger­
many1 s change of policy, a motive which Is not discussed in 
Buelow,s notoriously inaccurate memoirs.
8 Rue-low, Ifoiso-lrs. I, 3^2.
10.3
In 1897 the Transvaal Government set up a commission of
inquiry into the partial collapse of the gold “lining boom*
Many of the principal Gorman banking interests, such as
Goerts, the representative for the Deutsche Bqnfe. openly
criticised the Boers and began to refuse funds to them. A
number of industries whose market in the Transvaal primarily
depended upon mining .aligned themselves with the Deutsche
Bank; German newspapers, such as the Koe.i'al.scIie_ Se.ltnns and
the N-orddeufcacha Alliiemalnc also began to turn
9against the Boers, Has xx xnsp i.red from above.M The German 
consul at Pretoria declared that he had to defend himself 
against both the German banking interests and Rhodes at the 
same time and expressed his fear that Portugal, having re­
jected Kruger*s offer of financial assistance, would turn to 
Britain for help and lose her colonies* The banking Interests 
did not want the latter to occur, and thus they also took 
an active interest in the settlement ox Portugal*s finan­
cial problems. Among the leaders in this policy was the 
Dagmstae.dtar Bank * In which William himself had a personal 
Interest."-'
The Anglo-German Agreement went Into effect immediately 
after Hatzfeldt and Balfour signed it on August 39, but it 
soon became apparent that the problem of the Portuguese 
colonies had not been solved* On September 1 Hatzfoldt told
^ .Anderson, Anti-English. Feeling * pp. 270-271.
10 laid., p p. 271-272.
Balfour that, according to German Information, Portugal was 
sounding out France on the possibility of a loan5 Lisbon would 
rather have a French loan than Anglo-German parallel agree­
ments. Since France had Indicated that she would not be 
able to give an answer to Portugal# s request until October 1, 
Germany and Great Britain would have a month to convince 
Several to accept the general views of the two governments. 
Salisbury, In. a minute to the report of this conversation, 
bitterly added that Germany wanted to rfforce the pace of des- 
tiny*11 Great Britain could give no assurances to Germany of 
compliance to her request because Great Britain did not know 
what sort of financial terms Germany would give Portugal* 
Besides, added Salisbury, since Britain already had free right
of pre-emption on the east coast of Africa, a French loan
11would pose no threat to Great Britain.
The next day Balfour wrote that open negotiations with 
France on the part of Portugal "would lead to serious com­
plications1* because of previous arrangements. Lisbon could 
not borrow from any country on the security of Belagoa Bay 
other than Great Britain because, of the Anglo-Portuguese 
agreement of 1891. If Portugal wanted a large loan, however, 
she had to mortgage her most valuable property, B©lago& Bay|
In order to secure such a loan, she had to come to an agree­
ment with the newly-formed Anglo-German combination. Portugal
HBalfour to Lascalles," September 1, 1898, £• |J., 1, 
75-76, no. 91**
1  p
seamed unable to avoid the Anglo-German parallel loans*
Even Salisbury5 who had become greatly concerned over the 
French interests in the Portuguese colonies and the possible 
effects on the Anglo-German agreement, began to exert some 
pressure in favor of the loan* He agreed to discuss the mat­
ter with Several and to rtintimate to him that any loan from 
France must not be secured on the customs of Angola*
In early October the British Prime Minister reported 
that French sources had offered Portugal a loan of 1.6,000,000 
if that country would allow a French controlled company to 
administer her railway revenues, would earmark a greater por­
tion of Portuguese customs for debt conversion, and would 
agree to the formation of an Issue Committee to supervise 
Portuguese finances* Salisbury declared his opposition to 
any form of joint guarantee or control of Portuguese fin-
ik
ances and the plan failed to materialise*
By early November the proposed loan appeared to be no 
closer to fulfillment than when the two powers signed the 
agreement. The German Imperor, however, appeared delight­
ed with the agreement and referred to it as the corner­
stone of an alliance between the two powers* He even In­
formed his mother that he had reached a full understanding 
with England, although this statement also proved to b©
“Salisbury to Lascelles," September 9, 1898, B. £*,
I, 78, no. 97.
^  “Salisbury to 10300.1103,“ October 3, I898, 2*




On Hoverabor 5 Several, in a eonforenee with Salisbury, 
informed the British Prime Minister of further negotiations 
between his government and France* He outlined the limita­
tions which Portugal had agreed to place on the loan* and 
Salisbury concluded that ,ftho financial measures taken by 
Portugal for dealing with her creditors are a matter entirely 
for her own d e c i s i o n * H e  apparently at this meeting did 
not attem.pt to convince the Portuguese minister of the ad­
visability of an Anglo-German loan* although he again narrowed 
the possible alternatives to such an arrangement, Salisbury 
accepted the idea of a French loan to Portugal, hut he op­
posed any mention of other Portuguese territory, such as the 
A sores* as security for the loan— French influence could be­
come too strong in these regions. Great Britain was bound by 
a treaty to protect Portugal from attack, but she would not 
do this if the Portuguese would modify the treaty by aliena­
ting territory to France.
On January 11, 1399, Several reported to Salisbury that 
he felt the efforts to raise a loan in Paris would prove un­
successful because of German opposition to such .a loan. The 
Prime Minister attempted to reassure Several about German
lff Sidney Ties, Kina Sdward III, 4 Biography (Hew Borki 
The Macmillan Company, 1925), il7739*
^  "Salisbury to Bac'lonell," November 7> 1898, £. J>.» I 
79, no. 100.
U  "Biggs to Queen Victoria," December 25, 1898, 0. V. 4* ?
3rd scries, III, 322-323.
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designs and suggested that countries other than Portugal had 
attempted to raise loans in Paris and had failed.*^ Later a 
Portuguese financial agent attempted to raise a loan in Lon­
don, hut when he was unsuccessful, he again turned to Paris. 
This time he was successful*
Hie Lisbon Government had planned to use its 72,000 
debentures of the Portuguese Royal Railway valued at 48^0,000 
for the Berne Award, but it finally mortgaged them through 
some French financiers for 4500,000. The contract provided 
that if the debentures were not redeemed before the time ex­
pired, Prance could have the option of retaining them at a 
specified price* The British hintstor in If sbon, Sir Hugh 
MacDonall, saw the danger of France gaining control of the 
Portuguese railway system and urged his Government to con­
vince a private British firm to advance the money to Lisbon. 
tfIt would be a political roaster-strobe,Jf and Greet Britain
19would acquire a voice in the aim'nlstratlon of the railways, 
nothing came of this suggestion.
The Portuguese ambassador reported on June 7, 1399, 
that tha financial picture in Portugal was improving and that 
Portugal would probably not need a loan at that tine. Several, 
however, did express a fear that either Germany or France 
ailght send Portugal an ultimatum demanding the institution
i G
" "Salisbury to .MacDonoll," January 11, 1899, 5* 2.,
X, 82, no. 106.
19 m-facDonolX to Bertie, ?# Aoril 20, 1399«» fi* I>., X,
83-#*, no. 108.
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of a control over Portugal^ customs in order to pay the
creditors of their own country. The British Prime Minister
declared that Great Britain would oppose such interference
P0in por tugal1s finane os* ~
The Anglo-*German discussions had originally been made 
necessary as a. result of the German, threat to the British 
position in. South Africa* Tensions between Great Britain 
and the Transvaal continued to mount in the summer of 1899, 
but Britain still had not closed the South African Republic *s 
last non-British link with the outside world* The Anglo- 
German agreement had effectively eliminated the latter from 
all connections with the Transvaal, as Bngland had intended, 
but the Boers could still purchase arms from other sources 
and import them through Delagoa Bay. Salisbury emphasized 
the value of Delagoa Bay and warned Portugal against any 
change of policy over the Portuguese ports ?,IIer Majesty*s 
Government could not regard, the transfer of the control of 
Delagoa Bay to a foreign. Power as otherwise than an im-
pi
frxendly act. n'~
The German minister in. Lisbon, in the middle of July,
achnowleged that, "for the moment,” the Anglo-German loan
P 2to Portugal was cut of the question.** On many occasions
2® ^Salisbury to I-facDonell,n June 7, 1899, B. 2- , x,
8h*, no. 109*
”Salisbury to MacDonoll,” June 17, 1899, £* 2*, -~5 
85, no. 110.
22 JtMaeDonell to Salisbury,” disnatched July 22, 1899,
B. D-, x? 87, no. 112.
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Several had expressed apprehensions over German designs on 
the Portuguese colonies* and Great Britain was able to take 
advantage of Germany’s position outside of Portugal’s con­
fidence to conclude an agreement with Lisbon which was in 
spirit completely opposed to the toglo-German agreement of 
August 30, 1093.
In a meeting with Several on September 13, Salisbury
urged Portugal to prevent the flow of arms to the Transvaalf
this would be.advantageous for Great Britain, and Portugal
would not have to become involved in hostilities with the
Transvaal• Soveral, however, declared that Portugal could
not remain neutral if war broke out between Great Britain and
the Transvaal§ she would join Great Britain, who could then
use the Delagoa Bay Railway and mount an offensive from all
sides* fh© Portuguese minister even said he had been ©m~
PRpowered to sign such an alliance.
Several’s proposal immediately put Salisbury on the 
defensive. Since Germany and England had agreed to inform 
the other Government if it received special privileges,and 
were bound to “use its influence to obtain for the other 
Government similar special privileges of an occasional char­
acter and of equal value,** Portugal’s participation on the 
side of Great Britain would require compensation for Germany* 
England could not allow Germany to take her ally’s territory
“Salisbury to MacDonell,” September 13, 1899, B* £•,
I, 88, no* 113* *"*
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because Lisbon had assisted in the war against the Boers*
The British minister in Lisbon said he felt the Portuguese
disliked the Anglo-German agreement so such that they would
2*f
try to destroy It through an Anglo-Portuguesa pact* Al­
though Salisbury did say that he wanted Portugal to agree to 
declare war against the Transvaal on British invitation? 
he clearly sought to avoid Portuguese participation. Even 
neutrality would be unacceptable, because the British Ad­
miralty pointed out that a Portuguese declaration of neutral­
ity In the event of war would prevent British ships from 
coaling at Delagoa Bay.
Salisbury sought an agreement with Portugal which would 
give Great Britain the opportunity to block arms shipments to 
the Transvaal and assure a coal supply for the British navy 
and still not violate the Anglo-German agreement* The Prime 
Minister suggested that Soveral !f insert in the note we pro­
pose to sign that Portugal will not * in the event of war 
between England and the Transvaal, proclaim her neutrality.ff^
The Anglo-Portuguesa Agreement of October 1899? was, 
for the most part, merely a reaffirmation of statements from 
two earlier Anglo-Portuguese treaties* These would imply Por­
tuguese assistance to Great Britain without legally violating
“MaeDonell to Bertie,{? September 13, 1899, 2* 2*, I, 
90, no. 115*
^  11 Salisbury to Soveral,” n* d., B. J2*, X, 92-93, enc. 
in no* 117*
26 » P- 9*S enc.
Ill
the Anglo*Oer©an agreement. A treaty between the two powers
signed on January 29, I6*f2, stated that
neither of the said Kings shall do or attempt any­
thing against each other or in their Kingdoms, nor 
shall consent nor adhere unto ss&m war counsel or
treaty in prejudice of the other.
Portugal also agreed to prohibit the transfer of arms to the 
Transvaal and to refrain from a declaration of neutrality. 
When the war came a short time later Great Britain was able 
to precede without any opposition from the. outside* except
for the opposition of public opinion throughout Bur ope.
ffAnglo-Portuguese Secret Convention*11 October 1899 * 
&* &*» if 93-*3**> no. 1X8. The contents of this convention were 
not coninunicated to the German Government until 1913*
OOmiUBJOUB
The Anglo-German Agreement of August 30, 1893, did not 
succeed in its avowed purnose of providing a joint loan to 
Portugal. Since Lisbon waa able to recover a certain amount 
of fiscal stability, it did not need assistance from the two 
powers. The agreement, however, did have definite repercus­
sions on the international scene in the years limnedlately 
following its conclusion and for this reason becomes impor­
tant in the diplomacy of the late-nineteenth century.
England had carved out an empire in southern Africa early 
in th© century, although she did not expand from her original 
claims until other C OLIO, ‘v V ies showed their interest. Portuguese 
and German claims, in addition to the semi-independent enclave 
of the Transvaal,prevented complete control of this region, 
Portugal had often faced serious native uprisings in her finan­
cially burdensome African territories, but th© strong Portu­
guese national pride in the empire prevented any alienation 
of territory. Germany had begun to adopt a strong pro-colonial 
attitude only in the waning years of the century.
Great Britain and Germany had been “natural allies’1 ever 
since the formation of the German Empire in I87I--moreso since 
the signing of the Franco-Russian pact* Great Britain feared
U 3
the Kussian threat In the Mediterranean and In the Far East; 
she was also Involved in numerous serious colonial clashes with 
France in Africa* Germany also publically expressed concern 
over a possible war of revenge with Prance. Great Britain and 
Germany together had participated in many discussions of inter­
national problems, but despite occasional territorial agree­
ments, there were no political ties. Great Britain was tra­
ditionally bound to a policy of non-entanglement in European 
affairsf and Germany would accept nothing less than full 
British partnership in the Triple Alliance.
Joseph Chamberlain had openly advocated closer ties 
with Germany, perhaps even an alliance, but the German ambas­
sador in bondon, acting under Instructions from Berlin, sought 
to delay concluding an agreement. If Germany could avoid th© 
desired alliance with England, she could take advantage of her 
valuable position and secure additional benefits— perhaps In 
colonial matters— as a condition to Anglo-German concord.
The proposed Anglo-Portuguese loan fitted perfectly th© 
German plan. The Wilhelmstrasse was not particularly con­
cerned about the fate of the Portuguese Empire, except where 
she herself might benefit. Perhaps this can best be demon­
strated by pointing out that Germany at first demanded British 
territory— 'Walfisch Bay and Blaatyr©— in addition to parts of 
the Portuguese colonies. Also, in July, 1899, the British 
ministar in Lisbon was compelled to denounce the efforts of 
his Gorman counterpart for attempting to force Portugal Into
l i b
the Anglo-Gormaa loan* If Portugal failed to make the loan 
Germany would gain nothing, despite the sacrifice of Delagoa 
Bay.
Lord Salisbury, hardly an impartial observer, said that 
Germany only awed, ted the collapse of the Portuguese financial 
structure in order to claim her share of colonies; Great 
Britain, on the other tend, sought only to preserve the in* 
tegrity of Portugal* Although this is essentially correct, 
the British were less guided by altruistic motives for main­
taining the Portuguese empire than by an attempt to strengthen 
the British empire* If Portugal were to collapse, both Ger­
many and Prance could claim portions of the Portuguese colonies 
and threaten British colonial interests in Africa. 'While Great 
Britain was also concerned with the stability of the Portuguese 
monarchy— the loss of colonies could seal the doom of Carlos 
X— her primary interest lay in Africa* The British interests 
were protected when Germany renounced all claims to Delagoa
Bay; she would benefit even if Portugal did not agree to the
1
loan* With the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, Great Britain 
closed the door of the Transvaal to other interested parties.
Germany, at the beginning of her negotiations with Great 
Britain over the Portuguese colonies, had written off Delagoa 
Bay to. Great Britain. While th© Wilhelmstrasse attributed 
this to prior British claims, the Gorman action was obviously
^ One writer says that England possibly even aided Portu­
gal to secure the .French loan so as to avoid the consequences 
of the Anglo-German agreement. See banger, .Diplomacy o£ JmiQXl'
m m ,  II, 529.
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part of a larger premeditated plan* There appeared no chance 
of Portugal easing her fiscal crisis without a loan; even 
then the prospects of financial recovery were bleak* Ger­
many relinquished her ties in the Transvaal in the hope of 
making solid gains in other areas*
A little over a year after Great Britain and Germany 
signed their agreement over the Portuguese colonies. Great 
Britain and the Transvaal were at war* While one will never 
know what may have happened had. the two countries not signed 
the agreement, it is likely that the agreement allowed Great 
Britain to pursue a more confident policy in South Africa*
The British Government had been concerned with German interests 
in the Transvaal* and there was the fear that, if war broke 
out, Germany would actively Intervene, as the German Emperor 
had originally proposed in 1896* Portugal would certainly 
have refused German troops the right to cross Mozambique to 
enter the Transvaal, and Great Britain and Portugal may have 
formed a coalition against Germany* Mar may also have spread 
to the continent* Such' a conflict mpy have developed without 
the Anglo-German agreement of 1898; certainly Milner and 
other British leaders were concerned over possible German- 
Transvaal co-operation* Although Germany realised that the 
British control of the seas could mitigate against any overt 
assistance to the Transvaal, she could apply pressure else­
where. Of course, while history in the conditional is always 
interesting, it is seldom anything more*
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England and Germany began negotiations over the Portu­
guese African colonics at a tine -when the two powers were 
also discussing methods of reaching a general understanding. 
The Portuguese question soon became of primary importance and 
when completed, it briefly brought improvement in Anglo- 
German relations* ‘The outspoken public opinion, however, ex­
cited by the passage of the first naval law in Germany and 
the worsening of British relations with the Transvaal, pro­
hibited an agreement* Chamberlain erroneously thought the 
agreement would bring about conditions favorable for an al­
liance* His later plea for an Aaglo-Gerraan alliance on 
November 30, 1899, failed to bring a warm response from 
Buetw, who wan hampered by a pro-Boer press and nubile. An 
Anglo-German agreement over China in October, 1900, pro­
duced no general alliance, and a last attempt aborted in 1901. 
After this the gradual alignment of Ore itain with France 
and German colonial activity made a close alliance impossible.
The Anglo-German Agreement of August 3$, 1898, was an 
attempt to secure an understanding between two colonial powers, 
one established, one aspiring. It secured no lasting friend­
ship, although it may have averted a possible Anglo-German 
clash at that time. Most assuredly it aided the British 
colonial policy in South Africa? it perhaps also embarrassed 
the German diplomats who came away empty-handed.
APPsrrarx a
THU ANGLO-G 53 KAIT AGH3S’3TJT, AUGUST 30, 18981
In view of the possibility that Portugal may require 
financial assistance from some foreign Power or Powers* and 
in order to obviate the International complications which 
such a condition of things may produce, and to preserve her 
integrity and independence^ the Undersigned , duly authorised 
by their respective Sovereigns* have agreed as follows * ~
I* Whenever either the British or the German Government 
Is of the opinion that it is expedient to accede to a request 
for an advance of-money to Portugal on the security of the 
Customs revenues or other revenues of Mozambique* Angola, 
and the Portuguese part of the Island of Timor, It shall 
communicate that fact to the other Government, and the other 
Government shall have the right to advance a sortion of the 
total sum required*
In the event of the other Government signifying its In­
tention to exercise this right, the two Governments shall 
consult as to the terms of the two loans, and these loans 
shall be Issued on the security of the Customs revenues of 
Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor as near as possible 
simultaneously. The loans shall bear as near as possible 
the same proportion to each other as the amounts of the Cus­
toms revenues respectively assigned as their security.
The loans shall be issued on terms as favourable to Por­
tugal as the condition of the money market and the security 
of the loans permit, and shall In other respects be subject 
as near as possible to similar conditions.
II. Of the Customs revenues, referred to in Article I, 
those of the Province of Mozambique south of the Zambezi, and 
of the part of that Province l y l  ng on the left bank of the 
Zambezi above its confluence; with the Shire, and those of the 
portions of the Province of Angola, as hereinafter described, 
shall be assigned to the British loan. The Customs revenues 
of the remaining part of the Provinces of Mozambique and 
Angola and the Customs revenues of Portuguese Timor shall be 
assigned to the German loan.
The portion of the Province of Angola, of thieh the Cus­
toms revenues shall be assigned to the British loan, is
 ^f,Kr. Balfour to Lascelles,fl August 311 1898, £• t>.,
I, 71-72, enclosure in No. 90,
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comprised within the following limits# the northern frontier 
shall rim from the coast along the 8th parallel of south 
latitude to the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, 
thence it shall descend that degree to the 9th parallel of 
latitude, and shall follow that parallel eastwards as far as 
the frontier o f the Congo Free State* The southern frontier 
shall start from a point of the coast 5 English miles north 
of Sgito, and shall rim thence due east to the eastern fron­
tier of the Province of Angola* The western frontier shall 
be the sea; the eastern frontier shall be the eastern limit 
of the Province of Angola*
111* Any Delegates sent- by Great Britain or v.j*ern*any to 
take note of the collection of the revenues which are the 
security for their respective loans shall have only rights 
of inspection, but no rights of administration, interference, 
or control, so long as there is no default in the payment of 
interest or sinking fund*
17* In case of default in the payment of the interest 
or sinking fund of either loan, the administration of the 
various custom-houses in the two provinces and in Portuguese 
Timor shall be handed over by Portugal; those assigned for 
the Gorman loan to Germany, those assigned for the British 
loan to Great Britain*
V* It Is well understood tuat all rights, wh c t nor 
British or German, acquired in the provinces affected before 
the date of this Convention, shall be fully safeguarded pro­
vided they are of a purely private character, and convey 
neither political rights nor territorial or administrative 
jurisdiction,
It Is also understood that m> influence wi 11 bo used in 
the future, either by the British or the German Governments, 
to obtain fresh Concessions, except In those portions of the 
provinces of which the customs revenues are assigned to their 
respective loans*
YI* The present Convention shall bo ratified, and the 
ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon as possible• 
The Convention shall come Into force immediately after the 
exchange of ratifications*
In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised, 
have signed the same, Done In duplicate, at London, the 
30th day of August, 1898*
(L* S.) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR*
(L* 3*} P. HA.T2FSLDT*
SECRET COTTTUNTIOU^
Whereas, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
2 "Balfour to Lascelles," August 31, I898, £• j)., I,
72-73, enclosure in Ho.91*
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Convention of this doy’o date* it may unfortunate!y not be 
found possible to maintain the integrity of the African pos­
sessions of Portugal south :;f the Equator, as well ns those 
in Timor, the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective 
Sovereigns, have further agreed as follows:—
I. Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to oppose the 
intervention of any third Power in the Provinces of Mozam­
bique, Angola, and in Portuguese Timor, either by way of loan 
to Portugal on the security of the revenues of those provinces, 
or by way of acquisition of territory, by grant, cession, 
purchase, lease, or otherwise*
II* It is understood that, from the conclusion of the 
Conventions of this day#s date, Great Britain will abstain 
from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, 
occupation, control or exercise of political influence in or 
ever those portions of the Portuguese provinces in which the 
Customs revenues have been assigned to Germany, and that 
Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing any claim 
of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, control* 
or exercise of political influence, In or over those portions 
of those Portuguese provinces in which the Customs revenues 
have been assigned to Great Britain*
III* In case Portugal renounces her sovereign rights over 
Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor, or loses these ter­
ritories in any other manner, it is understood that the sub­
jects of, and natives of the Protectorates of one Contracting 
Party, together with their goods and ships, and also the pro­
duce and the manufactures of Its dominions, possessions, 
Colonies and Protectorates, shall, in such portions of the 
territories comprised in the present Convention as may fall 
to the other Contracting Party, participate in all the pre­
rogatives, exemptions and privileges with regard to trade, 
commerce, taxation and navigation which are there enjoyed 
by the subjects of, and natives of the Protectorates of, the 
other Contracting Party.
IV# With regard to the Vth Article of the Convention of 
to—day*s date, vh ich refers to private rights of British or 
German, subjects In the Provinces of Mozambique, Angola, and 
Portuguese Timor, 'it is well understood between the two Govern­
ments that this Article applies, among others, to the so-called 
Katembe Concession, and, farther, that the Government of Groat 
Britain will adopt a friendly attitude In respect to the con­
firmation of this Concession by the Portuguese Government In 
case such a confirmation should be applied for*
V* The present Convention shall be ratified, and the 
ratifications thereof shall he exchanged as soon as possible* 
The Convention shall come Into force Immediately after the 
exchange of ratification.
In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised, have
1 2 0
signed the same, and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate, at London, the 30th Day of August,
1398.
CL* S.) ARTHUR JAHTS BALFOUR..
(L* S.) P. H ATZFHIX.OT•
SECRET N0TB3
In order to make clear the intention, of the loro Conventions 
of this day’s date- it is further understood between the two 
Governments as follows*--
In the event of one of the two Governments obtaining from 
the Portuguese Government before the contingency contemplated 
in Article III of the Secret Convention a cession of terri­
tory, or the concession of special privileges not of an oc­
casional character, in those portions of the Portuguese Pro­
vinces of Mozambique, Angola, or Timor, the customs revenues 
of which have been assigned zo it, it is well understood 
between the two Governments that such cessions of territory, 
or concessions of privileges, shall not become operative until 
anologous grants as near as possible of equal value have been 
accorded to the other Government in those portions of the 
provinces, the customs revenues of which have been assigned 
to it by the present arrangement*
In case either Government applies for special privileges 
of an occasional character It shall immediately inform the 
other Government, and if these privileges are granted, cind if 
the other Government should desire It, shall use Its influence 
to obtain for the other Government similar special privileges 
of an occasional character end of equal value*
And whereas, wing to the imperfect surveys which, alone 
are at present available, the TInd Article of the Convention 
of this day’s date may not exactly carry out the intentions 
of the Contracting Parties, it is understood between Them 
that In any case the port and the town of Ambriz shall be in­
cluded in the security assigned to Germany.
In case, therefore, that the port and town of Ambriz should 
be found to lie to the south of the 8th parallel of south lati­
tude, the line of demarcation shall start from a. point on the 
coast 5 English miles south of the port of Ambriz, and be con­
tinued thence due east until it reaches the 16th degree of 
longitude east of Greenwich*
From the Intersection of the line, which may be deter­
mined as the line of demarcation, with the 16th degree of longi­
tude aforesaid, the line shall, if necessary be extended along
3 "Balfour to lascellos," August 30, 1898, £. £>., I, ?k-75,
enclosure in No. 92*
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that degree of longitude so far south of the 9th parallel of 
south latitude as will secure to Germany a strip of territory 
not less than a geographical degree in width between the south­
ern extremity of the Congo Free State in the region of Lunda 
and the northern frontier of the portion of Angola of which 
the customs revenues are assigned to Great Britain*
(L* S.) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR. 
(L* S.) P. HATZFBLOT.
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